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ABSTRACT 
This thesis sets out to examine the status of implementation of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in Saskatchewan and the CRC’s impacts on 
Indigenous children and their access to justice within the child welfare system. Research 
methods included a review of case law, literature and legislation. Informed persons 
employed in the child welfare field were then interviewed. I argue that Canada’s 
inadequate implementation of the CRC has devastating impacts on Indigenous children 
subject to the child welfare system in Saskatchewan. The overrepresentation of 
Indigenous children in Saskatchewan’s child welfare cases is alarming and is the result of 
Canada’s colonial history. Representation for children is limited to a Euro-Canadian 
framework that perpetuates racism and an un-interrogated cultural bias rooted in our 
understanding of children’s rights as being limited to individual rights. This thesis 
identifies different models of legal representation adopted by lawyers and justice systems 
in child welfare cases and offers alternatives to the current model used in Saskatchewan. 
The current use of lawyers as representatives for Indigenous children raises concerns with 
respect to availability of counsel and potential bias when advocating for an Indigenous 
child. This thesis argues that provincial jurisdiction over child welfare is invalid, as 
Indigenous peoples never ceded child welfare, and that child welfare needs to be 
deliberately transitioned to Indigenous control.  I conclude that rights in the CRC would 
be better met for Indigenous children if child welfare were deliberately placed back into 
the hands of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous models of child welfare have greater 
potential to ensure that meaningful voice for Indigenous children is met and thereby 
ensures that international obligations under the CRC are fulfilled. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
For thousands of years, Indigenous communities successfully used traditional 
systems of care to ensure the safety and well-being of their children. Instead of 
affirming these Indigenous systems of care, the child welfare systems disregarded 
them and imposed a new way of ensuring child safety for Indigenous children and 
youth, which has not been successful. Indigenous children and youth continue to 
be removed from their families and communities at disproportionate rates, and 
alternate care provided by child welfare systems has not had positive results.1 
 
In Saskatchewan, Indigenous children make up approximately 30 percent of the 
child population and over 80 percent of the children in child apprehension cases.2 This 
thesis explores the relationship between the implementation of Article 12 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child3 (CRC or Convention) and the 
overrepresentation of Indigenous children in the child welfare system. The CRC has been 
signed by 194 countries and ratified by 192 countries. It is the most ratified convention in 
the world, but despite its vast acceptance it has not been intentionally implemented into 
the legislative frameworks of the signatory or ratifying countries. In Canada, the CRC is 
not incorporated into legislative frameworks at the provincial or federal level. The CRC 
intended to universalize children’s rights and recognize children as ‘rights bearers.’ 
																																																								
1 Cindy Blackstock et al, Reconciliation in child welfare: Touchstones of hope for Indigenous 
children, youth, and families. Ottawa, ON, Canada: First Nations Child & Family Caring Society 
of Canada / (Portland: National Indian Child Welfare Association, 2006.) online: 
http://www.fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/docs/Touchstones_of_Hope.pdf 
2 V. Galley, Summary Review of Aboriginal Over-representation in the Child Welfare System. 
Prepared for: Saskatchewan Child Welfare Review Panel, 2010. SEE Aboriginal Children in 
Care: Report to Canada’s Premiers” (Prepared by: Aboriginal Children in Care Working Group, 
2015) online: 
<http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/phocadownload/publications/aboriginal_children_in_care_repor
t_july2015.pdf>. 
3 The United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, (20 November 
1989) vol. 1577, p. 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) [CRC]. 
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However, much dispute remains as to what ‘rights’ children can properly hold, their 
capacity as ‘rights bearers,’ and whether children’s rights undermine parental rights.4  
Article 12 of the CRC expressly recognizes the child’s ‘voice’ (participatory 
right) in matters affecting them. Article 12 further recognizes that children’s rights are 
not limited to welfare rights (protective rights and provisional rights), which include 
rights such as rights to shelter, food and clothing: 
Article 12 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner 
consistent with the procedural rules of national law.5  
 
The signatory countries unanimously agreed that children should be afforded some 
‘voice’ when facing the realities of state intervention in their lives. However, the 
mechanisms by which countries afford children ‘voice’ in matters of child welfare differ 
considerably. This difference is in part due to how a country may characterize children’s 
rights and how a country may decide to legitimize the CRC in its legislative framework. 
In Saskatchewan, the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in child welfare cases 
poses an additional threat to Indigenous children’s ‘voice’ because the Indigenous child’s 																																																								
4 SEE David Archard,Children: Rights and Childhood (New York: Routledge, 1993)., Brenda 
Hale, “Understanding Children’s Rights: Theory and Practice” (2006) 44 Family Court Review 
350, Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights (Boston; Harvard University 
Press, 2005)., and James G. Dwyer, “Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights” (1994) 82 Cal. L. Rev. Also SEE Confidential interview with a 
Director of a First Nations Child and Family Service Agency [FNCFSA] who identified parental 
issues in relation to child apprehensions as, “part of it is once you take a child out of their home 
and away from their parents it disengages them [parents] so much as parents it is like something 
happens to them. when they lose their parental authority it is really hard to put back.  It is like 
you have stripped them of something inherent to them”. 
5 Supra note 3.  
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access to justice in the child welfare system is limited by a colonial justice system and 
advocacy models based on western frameworks. A review of the case law, literature and 
interviews related to this research showed that current mechanisms for providing a child 
voice in the child welfare process are deeply rooted in euro-colonial frameworks. 
This thesis identifies different models of legal representation adopted by lawyers 
and justice systems in child welfare cases and offers alternatives to the current justice 
framework used in child welfare cases in Saskatchewan. Intended is a representational 
model that will afford Indigenous children meaningful ‘voice’ in child protection 
hearings that will reflect cultural and communal needs identified by Indigenous peoples 
as essential to maintaining their culture, language, identity and community. The current 
model of advocacy for children in Saskatchewan offers legal representation in a limited 
number of cases to children, and raises concerns with respect to how the lawyer 
advocating can adequately represent the child.  Incorporating the CRC into the Canadian 
legislative framework may alleviate the current uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the 
status of the Indigenous child’s right to be heard in child protection proceedings.  
For Indigenous children, access to justice includes notions of access to legal 
advocates, to information about their rights, access to culturally appropriate services and 
access to a culturally appropriate process. Procedural and substantive access to justice 
barriers for Indigenous peoples have been identified as including,  “poverty, illiteracy, 
poor education, recognition of lands and territories, and self-determination”6.  
Additionally, Anaya describes the collective dimension of access to justice including, 
“the right to maintain [Indigenous peoples’] own judicial system as part of their essential 																																																								
6 States News Service, Human Rights Council Holds Panel Discussion on Access to Justice for 
Indigenous Peoples.(Sept. 18, 2012). Maryland, United States. Quoting James Anaya.  
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right to self-determination and therefore the recognition of these systems” as an essential 
“part of their assertion of collective rights. Mainstream justice systems should aim to 
better integrate traditional and indigenous justice systems”7.  With respect to Indigenous 
children in Saskatchewan Woods described access to justice as having limitations based 
on the geographical location of many Indigenous communities. Remote communities are 
often unaware of advocacy services available for children, and therefore do not access 
those services. Additionally Woods notes that limitations of access to justice include 
inadequately trained counsel with respect to Indigenous culture and community that 
extends to judicial assessment of child welfare cases and front-line ministry workers.8 
This thesis takes a grounded theory approach with respect to interviews conducted 
and a mixed methods approach to qualitative research that includes document review, 
case law and legislation analysis, and key informant interviews. Grounded theory is a 
qualitative research approach traced to Glaser and Strauss.9 It is rooted in observation, 
where the researcher seeks to develop an explanatory theory about real-world conditions, 
or phenomena, of interest.10 For this research, interrogating the high representation of 
Indigenous children in the child welfare system, common contributing themes of which 
became evident throughout the interview process, was paramount to the consideration of 
alternative models of Indigenous child welfare. The iterative process of grounded theory 
supports data analysis, case study review and open-ended interview techniques as a 
means of collecting an array of integrative results to support a rational explanation of 
																																																								
7 Supra note 6.  
8 Sheri Woods, Panel Discussions, counsel for children and youth training program, Wanuskewin, 
October 14 2016.  
9 SEE Glaser BG Strauss AL (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 
research New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
10 Ibid. 
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phenomenon of interest. The intended output of grounded theory is not abstract reality, 
but rather, a contextually relevant and well-considered explanation of real world 
problems.  Key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from First 
Nations Child and Family Service Agencies (FNCFSA), Child Advocacy Programs and 
lawyers advocating for Indigenous children. Each chapter relies on a literature review 
including case law, policy, legislation and secondary sources. In order to contextualize 
the use of those sources, interview quotations are used throughout the body of the work 
and are not limited to one particular “results” section of this research.  
The interviews conducted in this research were used to identify common themes 
contributing to the Indigenous child’s lack of access to justice in Saskatchewan’s child 
welfare system.  The themes consistently identified by interviewees included 
Saskatchewan’s colonial history, residential schools, funding discrepancies of First 
Nation’s Child Welfare Agencies, concepts of children’s rights, western concepts of best 
interests of the child, role of the CRC, jurisdictional conflicts, and the role of lawyers and 
the justice system. All of the above issues are multi-faceted; therefore, identified issues 
are discussed to the extent that they relate to Indigenous children’s access to justice. 
Reviewing a large body of sources was essential because the ongoing crisis for 
Indigenous children in the child welfare system stems from multiple historical and 
current issues, including but not limited to racism, cultural bias, poverty, uneven access 
to resources, colonialism, and jurisdictional conflict. In order to gain an appropriate 
understanding of these many issues, a research approach based on grounded theory was 
necessary.   
6	
 
Eight people who could provide context to the Indigenous, policy, legal and 
sociological dimensions of child welfare in Saskatchewan were identified for interviews. 
Interviewees were contacted by email, and a time and place for the interview was 
arranged at their convenience.  Six of the interviews were conducted in person; two 
interviews were conducted over the phone.  All interviews were approximately 60 
minutes in length and were recorded. One interviewee identified that they preferred to 
remain confidential.  All other interviewees are identified by name throughout this work. 
The framework that guided interviews for this thesis can be found in Appendix A.   This 
research was approved by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Office, which 
can be found in Appendix B.  I am a non-Aboriginal woman, who was employed as a 
lawyer in Saskatoon prior to commencing this research project.  My experience working 
on Ministry of Social Services files suggested that there were barriers in access to justice 
for Indigenous children subject to the child welfare system, which I ultimately wanted to 
explore in this research project.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on literature and informed interviews to support 
the notion that the child welfare in Canada and Saskatchewan is merely an extension of 
the residential school system albeit under a different institutional name (child welfare). 
Chapter 3 focuses on concepts of children’s rights and rights theory and how those 
concepts may perpetuate Indigenous overrepresentation in the child welfare system.  
Understanding the child’s communal interests will achieve decisions in child welfare 
cases that more accurately reflect the child’s best interest as opposed to a perceived best 
interest. Chapter 4 explores other jurisdictions’ attempts to incorporate Article 12 of the 
CRC and what models may be useful in affording voice to Indigenous children in 
7	
 
Saskatchewan. Chapter 5 focuses on concepts of ‘best interest’ of the child, and how 
concepts of best interest in legal frameworks contribute to Indigenous overrepresentation. 
Chapter 6 explores current provincial programs intended to offer ‘voice’ to children in 
child welfare cases, and identifies limitations to the current legal framework. It is 
suggested that outcomes for children will vastly improve in Saskatchewan if Indigenous 
peoples were able to regain sovereignty over child welfare.  Ultimately, sovereignty over 
child welfare would significantly reduce the number of Indigenous children in care and 
would help restore Indigenous culture. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion and 
recommendations.  Chapter 7 also identifies the limitations of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATUS OF CHILD WELFARE IN SASKATCHEWAN  
The intention of this chapter is to provide the contextual framework, which has 
resulted in the vast overrepresentation of Indigenous children in Saskatchewan’s child 
welfare system today. Providing historical context is essential to both the reconciliation 
process and to any recommendations made with respect to this research. 
2.1 SASKATCHEWAN’S CHILD WELFARE HISTORY: SHAPING THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
We have a sanitized history in Canada, and it has not been like that for 
Indigenous people at all... So when you have five or six generations of the total 
institution of the residential schools then we have a context that is more 
understandable as to why there are community and family issues…layered 
overtop of that is a euro-Canadian child welfare system which is a total failure on 
all counts.11 Raven Sinclair 
 
Child welfare is the first issue identified in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRC) of Canada’s Calls to Action.12  Identifying child welfare as a 
primary concern in the reconciliation process explicitly identifies the pressing need to 
address child welfare concerns immediately in Canada. The federal, provincial and 
territorial governments have diminished inherent Indigenous child welfare rights. A lack 
of understanding of the Canadian legal system and a denial of access to justice during the 
Residential School system and the “Sixties Scoop” prevented Indigenous peoples from 
asserting their rights concerning matters involving their children.13 
In order to understand the current framework regarding child welfare in 
Saskatchewan, it is necessary to understand Saskatchewan’s child welfare history as it 
relates to Canada’s colonial history. Blackstock states that the residential school system 																																																								
11 Raven Sinclair, personal interview. Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Work, University of 
Regina, June 6 2016. 
12 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to Action (2015) online: 
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf  
13 Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Rights Litigation, Legal history and the Role of Experts” 2014 77 
Sask. L Rev 173 at 185.   
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was simply the beginning of the current child welfare system today.14 The TRC Calls to 
Action also notes this connection: “[w]hat has come to be referred to as the “Sixties 
Scoop” – the dramatic increase in the apprehension of Aboriginal children from the 
1960’s onwards – was in some measure simply a transferring of children from one form 
of institution, the residential schools, to another, the child-welfare agency.”15 Blackstock 
states that “[t]he bright line distinction in removal motivation does not survive a 
historical review.”16 Although the two institutions are often distinguished—the residential 
school system as being one that involved the forced removal of Indigenous children from 
their homes and community, and the child-welfare system as being involved in the 
protection of children facing harm—they are often indistinguishable.  Both institutions 
are/were premised on the assimilation of Indigenous children and a colonial project that 
arguably remains active in today’s child welfare system. 
This colonial project ignores the fact that Indigenous peoples exercised inherent 
jurisdiction over their children and families since time immemorial. At the Treaty 
Table,17 elders stated that the responsibility for children and families is sacred and 
fundamental to the laws of Indigenous communities.  Indigenous Nations never ceded 
this responsibility to their children at the time of Treaty making.  Further, Indigenous 
peoples have an inherent right to self-government, and by extension, child welfare 
matters, as recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitutional Act, 1982 
																																																								
14 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Assembly of First Nations v. 
Attorney General of Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development), 2011 CHRT 4 (CanLII) at para 60 
15 Supra note 12 at page 71. 
16 Supra note 1. 
17 Honourable Judge David M. Arnot,  Statement of Treaty Issues. (Office of Treaty 
Commissioner of Saskatchewan, October, 1998). 
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(Constitution).18 In Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General)19 Williamson J. 
stated: 
I have concluded that after the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown, and 
continuing to and after the time of Confederation, although the right of aboriginal 
people to govern themselves was diminished, it was not extinguished. Any 
aboriginal right to self-government could be extinguished after Confederation and 
before 1982 by federal legislation, which plainly expressed that intention, or it 
could be replaced or modified by the negotiation of a treaty. Post-1982, such 
rights cannot be extinguished, but they may be defined (given content) in a 
treaty.20 [Emphasis added].  
 
However, between 1885 and 1993, twenty residential schools operated in Saskatchewan 
to assimilate Indigenous Children into Anglo-European culture.21  A 1920 amendment to 
the Indian Act22 permitted the government to enter any home on a reservation wherein it 
believed that a child between the ages of 7 and 15 years resided. These children were 
then removed from their homes, families and communities and were forced to attend a 
residential school.  
The introduction of section 88 of the Indian Act in 1951 significantly changed 
Saskatchewan’s landscape of children in-care because provincial laws became applicable 
to those residing on reserve: 
88. Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of 
general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable 
to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws 
are inconsistent with this Act or the First Nations Fiscal Management Act, or with 
any order, rule, regulation or law of a band made under those Acts, and except to 
the extent that those provincial laws make provision for any matter for which 
provision is made by or under those Acts. 
 																																																								
18 Constitutional Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. 
19 Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] B.C.J. No. 1524. 
20 Ibid at para 179. 
21 Anna Kozlowski et al, First Nations Child Welfare in Saskatchewan (2011), online: Canadian 
Child Welfare Research Portal online <http://cwrp.ca/infosheets/first-nations-child-welfare-
saskatchewan > 
22 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5.  
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Effectively, section 88 of the Indian Act authorized provincial child welfare agencies’ 
interference with the governance of children on reserve. The lack of explicit reference 
to child welfare in either the Indian Act or the Constitution resulted in the 
provinces assuming responsibility for child welfare with limited regard to 
Indigenous child welfare practices.  During the 1950s provincial child and family 
services agencies began to apprehend Indigenous children.23 Between 1950 and 1970 the 
representation of Indigenous children in Ministry care increased from 1 percent to 63 
percent, now historically identified as the “Sixties Scoop.”24  Disputes during the “Sixties 
Scoop” regarding federal and provincial funding on-reserve resulted in child 
apprehensions being the only provincial child welfare service provided to First Nations 
communities.25  The dramatic overrepresentation continues today in Saskatchewan: 
approximately 80 percent of children in care are Indigenous while only 30 percent of the 
child population is Indigenous.26 
Dissatisfaction with provincially operated child welfare agencies in the 1980s 
caused many First Nations to develop independent federally-funded FNCFSA. These 
agencies developed out of a need for First Nations to regain autonomy over Indigenous 
children. Indigenous communities began entering into multilateral and bilateral 
agreements under the provisions set out in section 61 of the Child and Family Services 																																																								
23 Supra note 21. 
24 David McDonald and Daniel Wilson, “Poverty or Prosperity: Indigenous Children in Canada” 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (2013) online: www.policyalternatives.ca  
25 Marlyn Bennett, Cindy Blackstock, Richard De La Ronde, “A literature review and annotated 
bibliography on aspects of Aboriginal child welfare in Canada 2nd Ed”  (Ottawa: First Nations 
Child and Family Caring Society, 2005) online:  www.fncfcs.com/docs/ 
AboriginalCWLitreview_2ndEd.pdf relationship based on self-determination.  
26 “Aboriginal Children in Care: Report to Canada’s Premiers” (Prepared by: Aboriginal Children 
in Care Working Group, 2015) online: 
http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/phocadownload/publications/aboriginal_children_in_care_report
_july2015.pdf  
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Act (CFSA),27 wherein First Nation operated agencies could contract with the province of 
Saskatchewan to administer all or a portion of the provisions identified in the CFSA:  
61(1) The minister may, having regard to the aspirations of people of Indian 
ancestry to provide services to their communities, enter into agreements with a 
band or any other legal entity in accordance with the regulations: 
(a) for the provision of services or the administration of all or any part of 
this Act by the band or legal entity as an agency; or 
(b) for the exercise by the agency of those powers of the minister pursuant 
to this Act that are specified in the agreement 
(2) An agency that enters into an agreement pursuant to subsection (1) is 
responsible for the exercise of the powers of the minister to the extent to which 
those powers are specified in the agreement. 
 
Section 61 agreements in no way granted full autonomy to First Nations operated 
agencies but did put some limited control back into the hands of the community to 
administer all or part of the CFSA as articulated by the province.28 Policy decisions on 
how to implement child welfare policies are still subject to provincial control and forced 
upon FNCFSA, which contributes to First Nations’ frustration with implementing 
provincial legislation:  
When you think about it, there should be two different sets of policies, policies 
that the province makes with respect to non-indigenous peoples and policies that 
First Nations make on how they want to interpret the Child and Family Services 
Act…the government should not be able to tell first nations how to implement the 
Child and Family Service Act…. the Saskatchewan government says “you now 
have to implement this new policy”, instead of going to the chiefs and negotiating 
how to mutually get the best out of legislation.29 Josephine de Whytell 
 
																																																								
27 Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11. s.61. 
28 Raymond Shingoose, personal interview. Executive Director Yorkton Tribal Council Child and 
Family Services June 2016. Shingoose describes having very little control over policy 
development on how to implement the provincial CFSA. 
29 Josephine de Whytell, personal interview. Lawyer, Saskatoon Saskatchewan. June 8 2016. 
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Litigation between the Province and Saskatoon Tribal Council (STC) with respect to the 
section 61 agreements and the two parties’ relationship on the delivery of services has 
commenced 30:  
At its core, Saskatchewan [the province] seeks a declaration that it lawfully 
terminated a 1996 agreement which had delegated ministerial authority under The 
Child and Family Services Act, SS 1989-90, c C-7.2 [CFSA] to the Agency. By 
virtue of this termination, Saskatchewan contends the Agency no longer possesses 
the legal authority to exercise the powers, duties and responsibilities under the 
CFSA with respect to children on STC First Nations reserves. Consequently, 
Saskatchewan argues the Agency should be judicially constrained from 
purporting to exercise powers under the CFSA or in any manner interfere with 
Saskatchewan’s exercise of its statutory mandate under the CFSA.31 
 
The relationship between the province, provincial legislation and funding 
arrangements with Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) creates a piecemeal 
framework, which continues to plague the jurisdiction and authority to provide child 
welfare services in Indigenous communities.  By way of example, through the course of 
the litigation, STC describes its 1996 section 61 agreement with the province as a 
“bilateral agreement.” The Government of Saskatchewan describes the agreement as a 
“delegation” of Ministerial authority.32 However, STC relies on funding to administer the 
CFSA from the federal government [INAC]. As many of these provincial agreements 
come to an end or time for renewal, FNCFSA are increasingly concerned about their 
status under provincial agreements and about culturally appropriate care for children due 
to the vast overrepresentation of Indigenous children. As Raymond Shingoose, the 
Director of the Yorkton Tribal Council FNCFSA, articulates, unlike STC his agency is no 
longer arguing jurisdiction: they simply are asking the province to communicate its plan 
for on-reserve care to FNCFSA:  																																																								
30 Saskatchewan v STC Health & Family Services Inc, 2016 SKQB 236 (CanLII). 
31 Ibid at para 2. 
32 Supra note 30 at para 16. 
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The system right now just removes children and it makes it worse. We have been 
asking the province and the child advocates office, “what is your process for on 
reserve?” We aren’t arguing jurisdiction like they think we are, we just want to 
know what’s your process, how to implement their rules and laws - your 
investigations. They just go in without telling us.33 Raymond Shingoose 
 
Canada’s colonial history created a patchwork framework resulting in jurisdictional 
conflict, policy conflict, and an unbalanced access to services for Indigenous people all at 
the expense of Indigenous children.  
2.2 FUNDING PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE PROGRAMS 
If Indigenous agencies were funded at an equitable level, there is no telling what 
creative processes could be implemented.34 Raven Sinclair 
 
In 1991 INAC introduced a systematic method of allocating resources to federally 
funded First Nations child welfare agencies. The method introduced was two pronged, 
consisting of a new formula for allocating resources, Directive 20-1, and a manual, First 
Nations Child and Family Services National Program Manual.35 Both the formula and 
the manual “place[d] greater constraints on First Nations child welfare agencies by 
requiring them to conduct child welfare services based on provincial standards and by 
increasing control over funds for such services.”36 Directive 20-1 specifically granted 
funding for operational and maintenance costs related to child welfare, but not for 
preventative funding. It also failed to address specific community needs in relation to 
child welfare.  
In 1990 the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) drafted the Indian 
Child Welfare and Family Support Act (ICWFSA), acknowledging Indigenous 
jurisdiction over child welfare. However, it has not been passed by the Saskatchewan 																																																								
33 Supra note 28. 
34 Supra note 11. 
35 Supra note 21 at 10,11. 
36 Supra note 21. 
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Legislature, despite approval by First Nations’ in Saskatchewan.37  In response to INAC’s 
proposed ICWFSA legislation, the Saskatchewan government amended s. 61(1) of the 
CFSA to allow only for delegation of the provincial CFSA, which, arguably, was meant 
to stifle any First Nations’ sovereignty over First Nations operated agencies.  
The first CFSA section 61(1) agreement was signed in 1993 between the province 
and Touchwood Child and Family Services, and permitted Touchwood to conduct 
investigations under the CFSA. At this time funding remained under the Directive 20-1 
model wherein the operational and maintenance costs of conducting investigations under 
the CFSA were funded but preventative child welfare funding was not provided. To allow 
for a greater focus on prevention, INAC proposed the Enhanced Prevention-Focused 
Approach (EPFA) in 2008.  This approach complimented ICWFSA, which had expressed 
a need for preventative funding in conjunction with operational and maintenance 
funding.38 Although preventative costs were addressed in the EPFA model,  
Operations costs continue to be partially based on an assumed average rate of out 
of home placements rather than actual agency expenses and there does not appear 
to be a formal mechanism for linking AANDC funding levels to the shifting 
responsibilities mandated by provinces/territories. In addition, in contrast to 
directive 20-1, which covered actual maintenance expenses for children in out of 
home care, the new model designates a block of maintenance funds based on 
agency maintenance costs during the preceding year. This block funding 
method does not include a formal mechanism for covering costs associated with 
the maintenance of children with particularly complex special needs...39 
 																																																								
37 Government of Canada, Saskatchewan First Nations Prevention Services Model and 
Accountability Framework Agreement  (October 2007) online:< http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1326400134161/1326400183723>. SEE Supra note 28, as this was also 
highlighted by Raymond Shingoose. 
38 Supra note 21. 
39 Ibid. ALSO note interview with (Confidential interviewee) wherein the interviewee identified 
that block funding (funding that is provided once annually and not necessarily based on actual 
costs to the agency) does not work for FNCFSA’s because if the agency has a child who requires 
special needs facilities, equipment, or a special care arrangement, the FNCFSA will not have the 
funds to cover that child’s costs or will use all of the block funding provided to the agency. 
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Funding disparities relating to First Nations operated child welfare agencies resulted in a 
Human Rights challenge pursued by both the First Nations Child and Family Caring 
Society (FNCFCS) of Canada and the Assembly of First Nations40 against the Federal 
Government of Canada (at this time AANDC). The FNCFCS claimed that funding 
disparities between First Nations operated agencies and provincial agencies were in 
breach of section 5(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Code.41 The complaint was 
summarized in the decision as follows: 
Pursuant to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (the CHRA), the 
Complainants, the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada (the 
Caring Society) and the Assembly of First Nations (the AFN), allege AANDC 
discriminates in providing child and family services to First Nations on reserve 
and in the Yukon, on the basis of race and/or national or ethnic origin, by 
providing inequitable and insufficient funding for those services (the Complaint). 
On October 14, 2008, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) 
referred the Complaint to this Tribunal for an inquiry. [Emphasis added].42 
 
FNCFCS and AFN alleged that the provisions for services for children and families on 
First Nations’ failed to meet the needs of children and communities because inequitable 
and insufficient funding is available to implement services as compared to provincial 
funding for non-Indigenous children and families. On January 26 2016, the Human 
Rights Commission determined that the funding schemes provided to First Nations’ 
governed agencies were insufficient and substantially less than the funding provided to 
children who fell under provincial MSS program:.43  
																																																								
40First Nations Child and Family Caring Society (FNCFCS) of Canada and the Assembly of First Nations 2016	CHRT	2. 
41 Canadian Human Rights Act R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. at s.5. 
42 Supra note 14 at para 6.  
43 Ibid at para 121:  
[AANDC funds child and family services on reserves and in the Yukon in various ways. At 
the time of the complaint, there were 105 FNCFS Agencies in the 10 provinces across 
Canada (104 at the time of the hearing). The FNCFS Program applies to most of the FNCFS 
Agencies in Canada, uses two funding formulas: Directive 20-1 and the Enhanced 
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A real advocate would look at the inadequacies and the disparity of 
services….Thank God for the human rights outcome, because our evidence there 
was real.44Raymond Shingoose 
 
The Human Rights Commission also confirmed that the funding formulas used by 
the federal government allocating resources to First Nations’ operated agencies were 
outdated, provided less support than that available at the provincial level for services to 
meet the needs of Indigenous children and ultimately perpetuated discrimination against 
First Nations’ children and communities. Unlike other jurisdictions (like the United 
States for example), the Canadian federal government has not specifically legislated in 
the area of child welfare:  
Instead of legislating in the area of child welfare on First Nations reserves, pursuant 
to Parliament’s exclusive legislative authority over “Indians, and lands reserved for 
Indians” by virtue of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal 
government took a programming and funding approach to the issue. It provided for 
the application of provincial child welfare legislation and standards for First Nations 
on reserves through the enactment of section 88 of the Indian Act. However, this 
delegation and programming/funding approach does not diminish AANDC’s 
constitutional responsibilities [emphasis added] 
… 
First Nations children and families on reserves are in a fiduciary relationship with 
AANDC. In the provision of the FNCFS Program, its corresponding funding 
formulas and the other related provincial/territorial agreements, “the degree of 
economic, social and proprietary control and discretion asserted by the Crown” 
leaves First Nations children and families “…vulnerable to the risks of government 
misconduct or ineptitude” (Wewaykum at para. 80). This fiduciary relationship must 
form part of the context of the Panel’s analysis, along with the corollary principle 
that in all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the honour of the Crown is always at 
stake.45 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Prevention Focused Approach (the EPFA). In Ontario, funding is provided through the 1965 
Agreement. In certain parts of Alberta and British Columbia, funding is provided through 
the Alberta Reform Agreement and the BC MOU and, since 2012, the BC Service 
Agreement. Finally, in the Yukon funding is allocated pursuant to the Yukon Funding 
Agreement. 
44 Supra note 28 
45 Supra note 40 at para 83 & 95. 
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Additionally, by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act, the federal government has 
permitted the provinces to enter into agreements with First Nations governed agencies to 
carry out the provincial legislation. The financial means to do so has remained the 
responsibility of the federal government. As such, “AANDC has undertaken to ensure 
First Nations living on reserve receive culturally appropriate child and family services 
that are reasonably comparable to the services provided to other provincial residents in 
similar circumstances.”46 However, rather than focusing on actual needs of communities, 
funding formulas (both the EPFA and Directive 20-1)47 focus on population and outdated 
data to provide the allocation of funds. The Complainant argued that these formulas 
contributed to Canada’s long-standing goals of assimilation and continued discrimination 
stemming from Residential schools, which fail to meet the best interests of the child.48 
Canada’s provincial legislation, Canada’s commitment to international obligations under 
the CRC and international law in relation to Indigenous children unequivocally focuses 
on the “best interests” of the child being the paramount or primary consideration to 
programming and services for families and children.49 By failing to provide comparable 
funding to the provincial system, the best interests of Indigenous children were 
compromised by the Canadian federal government.50 Shingoose describes the gap in 
funding between the Ministry and FNCFSA as widening in his agency “the inequality of 
funding started off at 22%, then it went up to 38%, and now it is at 41%.”51  
																																																								
46 Supra note 40. at para 111. 
47 Supra note 21.   
48 Supra note 40. 
49 SEE Nicholas Bala & Rachel Birnbaum & Lorne Bertrand. “Controversy about the role of 
children’s lawyers: Advocate or best interest guardian? Comparing practices in two Canadian 
Jurisdictions with different policies for lawyers” (2013) 5 Family Court Rev 681.  
50 Supra note 40. 
51 Supra note 28.  
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The Human Rights Commission’s decision emphasized a need to implement 
“Jordan’s Principle.”52 Jordan’s Principle mandates that a government of first contact 
bear the responsibility of ensuring that services are provided to Indigenous children 
where there is a dispute between the federal and provincial branches of government.  As 
such, Jordan’s Principle requires that, should a dispute arise, the government of first 
contact shall provide the necessary services and recoup its cost should that be 
appropriate. Ultimately this principle prevents a situation arising wherein services are not 
adequately, efficiently or effectively provided due to an intergovernmental dispute. In 
light of the evidence provided, the tribunal found that the complaints were substantiated 
by the complainants and held that, 
The Panel is generally supportive of the requests for immediate relief and the 
methodologies for reforming the provision of child and family services to First 
Nations living on reserve, but also recognizes the need for balance espoused by 
AANDC. AANDC is ordered to cease its discriminatory practices and reform the 
FNCFS Program and 1965 Agreement to reflect the findings in this decision. 
AANDC is also ordered to cease applying its narrow definition of Jordan’s 
Principle and to take measures to immediately implement the full meaning and 
scope of Jordan's principle. 
More than just funding, there is a need to refocus the policy of the program to 
respect human rights principles and sound social work practice. In the best 
interest of the child, all First Nations children and families living on-reserve 
should have an opportunity “…equal with other individuals to make for 
themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs 
accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of 
society” (CHRA at s. 2).53 
 
The decision ultimately found that the federal government’s funding of FNCFS 
falls within its fiduciary relationship to First Nations, and funding increases to FNCFSA 
have now been promised by the federal government,  																																																								
52 “Jordan’s Principle”: In 2007 the House of Commons unanimously passed this principle; 
however, it has not been fully implemented by the federal, provincial or territorial governments. 
Notably one of the TRC recommendations in relation to child welfare is that Jordan’s Principle be 
fully implemented by all levels of government.  
53 Supra note 40 at para 481 and 482. 
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… one of the things that has happened is the federal government has said ‘ok we 
are going to increase funding for child welfare on reserve”.  What they have done 
is set a formula for increases… so they are increasing the funding over the next 
five years to First Nations agencies.54 Director of FNCFSA. 
 
While funding discrepancies significantly contribute to the over-representation of 
Indigenous children in the child welfare system (which in part results from the lack of 
preventative funding and culturally-appropriate services), the decision does not go as far 
as to suggest that child welfare programming be placed exclusively into the hands of the 
FNCFSA, nor was there the authority to do so under Canada’s Human Rights Legislation.  
Rather it remains the Canadian position, which is reflected in our Constitution and history 
with regards to First Nations’ communities and section 88 of the Indian Act, that First 
Nations are prohibited from assuming sovereignty in relation to laws and legal 
frameworks applying to Indigenous children.  
Children residing on reserve, or under reserve purview, were found to receive 
significantly less funding than children subject to the provincial or territorial schemes. 
Substantiated in the findings is that both operational and preventative costs hindered the 
ability of FNCFSA to provide mandated provincial and territorial services - which in turn 
impacted the FNCFSA ability to provide culturally appropriate services. The CHRC 
decision found as a finding of fact that the funding disparity was a breach of the Canadian 
Human Rights Act.55  Funding discrepancies prevent Indigenous children from having a 
‘voice’ in the child welfare process:  
Of particular concern for children’s rights is the federal government’s argument 
that federal services cannot be compared with provincial services. This violates 																																																								
54 Confidential, personal interview. Director of FNCFSA, August 29, 2016. 
55 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada, “Staying at Home: examining the 
implications of least disruptive measure in First Nations Child and Family Service Agencies” 
(2004) online: http://www.fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/docs/Staying_at_Home.pdf at 7. 
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the Convention right to equitable treatment for all children in 
Canada.56[Emphasis added] 
 
Indigenous communities argue that this chronic underfunding of child welfare services on 
reserve leads to poverty and poor living conditions, which then contributes to the vast 
overrepresentation of Indigenous child apprehensions.57 The evidence overwhelmingly 
supported the FNCFCS and AFN’s position that Indigenous children are disadvantaged 
by the current lack of services. During the course of the proceedings Blackstock 
identified that:  
The federal government wants to limit any comparator group analysis to First 
Nations children on reserve implying that: 1) it funds all First Nations children on 
reserves equally and thus there is no discrimination and 2) funding for non-
Aboriginal child welfare is outside of the federal government's mandate and thus 
any comparisons to provincial child welfare funding for other children is 
irrelevant.58 
 
Regardless of the federal government’s attempt to limit any comparator group, it was 
held that the Federal government has discriminated against Indigenous children and 
families receiving child welfare services by providing those families and children of 
federal jurisdiction significantly less funding,59 which runs counter to Canada’s 
obligations under the CRC.60 The only equitable solution is to ensure that funding is 
available to meet the needs of children, regardless of whether that child is considered to 
be a federal or provincial responsibility; however, implementation of this in light of the 
																																																								
56 Right in Principle, Right in Practice: Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in Canada. (2011) online: Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children 
http://www.cccabc.bc.ca/res/pubs/pdf/CCRC_Report_UN_CRC.pdf at 64. 
57 Cindy Blackstock, “The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal on First Nations Child Welfare: 
Why if Canada wins, equality and justice lose” (2011) 33:1 Children and Youth Services Rev 
187. 
58 Supra note 57. 
59 Supra note 40. 
60 Ibid. 
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outcome of the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society decision remains 
uncertain.61 
Although First Nations communities now have some control over the 
implementation of provincial legislation on reserve, the serious discrepancies in funding 
between the mainstream provincial child welfare system and FNCFSA system is causing 
what can be described as a second “Sixties Scoop.” The underfunding of FNCFSA 
perpetuates systemic disadvantages for Indigenous communities. Jurisdictional conflicts 
have resulted in “piecemeal progress towards self-determination for aboriginal peoples in 
Canada [which] has produced a patchwork of child welfare models serving aboriginal 
children”62:  
Aboriginal youth in care reported additional challenges they faced while in care. 
They stated that being placed into care and frequent placement moves in care 
separates young people from their immediate families and extended family and 
friends, as well as their cultural heritage and traditions. Many Aboriginal youth in 
care report feeling disconnected from their culture, which makes it difficult to 
develop their own identity.63 
 
The lack of funding contributes significantly to the overrepresentation of Indigenous 
children apprehended in the child welfare context, and thus contributes to the genocidal 
effect on Indigenous culture and the assimilation of Indigenous children, the loss of 
which gives rise to a loss of access to substantive justice. Further, underfunding raises 
access to procedural justice issues for Indigenous children, as their access to ‘voice’ in 
																																																								
61 Re-Imagining Child Welfare in Canada, Symposium. Toronto Ontario, Osgoode Law School. 
October 22, 2016. Working group discussions focused on how implementation of the decision has 
not been met by the federal government, as funding has not been increased to FNCFSA. 
Additionally, Cindy Blackstock indicated that following the Human Rights decision, the federal 
government ceased to provide any funding assistance to the Assembly of First Nations.  
62 Child Welfare Services in Canada: Aboriginal & Mainstream (2009-2010) online: National 
Collaborating Centre for Aboriginal Health<http://www.nccah-
ccnsa.ca/docs/fact%20sheets/child%20and%20youth/NCCAH-fs-ChildWelServCDA-2EN.pdf> 
63 Supra note 56 at 67. 
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the child welfare process is met with more barriers than non-Indigenous children. The 
provincial threshold system of removal forced upon Indigenous communities continues to 
drive forced assimilation and the erosion of Indigenous culture in Saskatchewan:  
The answer is not to remove the child from the family,… It breaks down creator’s 
laws, grandfathers’ law, grandmothers’ laws, and traditional laws specific to 
families… and breaks down tribal affiliation.  They come and force these laws 
upon us. 
… 
I was traditionally adopted by my grandparents. I was the oldest of the cousins, 
and one reason for doing that was so that the traditional knowledge could be 
passed down.  Then the Ministry came and said that they [my grandparents] were 
too old, and I was adopted out at 11 years old...my mom was not consulted, and 
there you have it, I ended up in Calgary then ran away when I was 17 and then 
caught the tail end of residential schools.64 Raymond Shingoose  
 
																																																								
64 Supra note 28.  
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CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:  DIFFERENT RIGHTS MODELS IN THE 
INDIGENOUS CONTEXT IN CANADA. 
We have developed our own legislation and it is premised on the spirit of the child 
being the voice of the child…. every year I ask for forgiveness from the creator 
through ceremony, because this job forces me to break our laws.65 Raymond 
Shingoose 
 
Perceptions of childhood vary significantly between different cultures, but 
perhaps even more acute are the variations between the historical view of children 
compared to the present western characterization of children and the rights they hold.66  
In Canada, Indigenous children are the primary subjects of child welfare cases.67  As 
such, concepts of children’s rights in an Indigenous context cannot be ignored when 
discussing child welfare in Saskatchewan. The lens through which we identify concepts 
of childhood and the rights children hold varies between cultures and significantly 
impacts children subject to the legal system. Western concepts of childhood and child 
advocacy may not appropriately address child welfare issues specific to Indigenous 
culture.  This chapter further exposes some of the competing rights present in the 
Canadian child welfare context as they relate to Indigenous children.  
3.1 CHILDREN AS RIGHTS BEARERS: WILL THEORY AND INTEREST THEORY MODELS 
Can you have rights at all if you are too young to exercise choice, when others have 
to enforce your rights for you, when the obligations upon which your most essential 
rights depend are often vague and ill-defined, and when you are too young to have 
reciprocal obligations of your own?68 
 
The above question raises opposing philosophical responses regarding the 
representation of children in child welfare cases. Different perceptions of childhood 																																																								
65 Supra note 28. 
66 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 37. 
67 Supra note 21. 
68 Brenda Hale, “Understanding Children’s Rights: Theory and Practice” (2006) 44 Family Court 
Review 350 at 351. 
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shape child representation in the context of child welfare in Saskatchewan. Archard 
suggests that concepts of childhood today are more distinct than in previous societies, and 
states that we define a child as someone who cannot yet enjoy the full rights or the 
responsibilities of an adult.69  In discussing moral rights, Archard states the following:  
[M]oral rights are possessed and exercised by children, if, according to the will 
theory, they can make choices, or according to the interest theory, they have 
interests of sufficient importance. It may be that children have some rights only 
insofar as they are children, though these rights may also be thought of as 
protecting the future adults the children will become. Children may share some 
rights with adults, although it is normally thought that they do not have the same 
liberty rights because they are not competent to make the same choices adults 
can.70  
 
The CRC, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms71 and domestic law all codify 
on some level certain rights for children. Perhaps the most significant, certainly the most 
globally accepted, is the CRC, which was ratified by 192 countries. The CRC sets out 
basic rights that are afforded to children, including, but not limited to, the right to heath, 
education, freedom of expression, and protection against abuse, violence, and economic 
exploitation. The CRC recognizes children’s rights and confirms that children, on some 
level, are in fact rights bearers. However, the rights protected within the CRC are 
predicated on the importance of individual rights, which raises specific concerns with 
respect to Indigenous children. One argument is that the CRC can no longer be 
considered in isolation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) with respect to Indigenous children.72 As such the relationship 
																																																								
69 Supra note 66 at 55 
70 Ibid. 
71 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11 [Charter]. 
72 Supra note 26 
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between the CRC and Article 1 of UNDRIP may offer some reconciliation of individual 
rights and communal rights with respect to Indigenous children: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as 
individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
international human rights law.73 
 
Additionally, UNDRIP has been identified as a means to recognize Indigenous peoples 
right to sovereignty and self-determination, and by extension child welfare in an 
international context; however, what remains uncertain in light of Canada’s adoption of 
UNDRIP is how autonomous and sovereign the right to self-determination will be 
interpreted in relation to Canada’s Indigenous peoples and how UNDRIP will be used to 
support Indigenous governance over child welfare matters.74  
Although Canada signed the CRC, the CRC has not been explicitly codified in 
Canadian law through legislative amendments at respective levels of government; 
however, Canada has committed to ensuring that existing and future legislation will 
conform to the CRC.75 Archard argues one reason that the CRC has not been codified in 
domestic law is that there is no international court to enforce those commitments made by 
ratifying counties,76 which suggests that only international treaties that have held 
signatory nations accountable in international courts have had significant impact.77 
																																																								
73 The United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 
2007, A/RES/61/295, online: http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html [accessed 31 March 
2016]. Article 1. 
74 Sonya Harris-Short, Aboriginal Child Welfare, Self-Government and the Rights of Indigenous 
Children Protecting the Vulnerable Under International Law. Ashgate Publishing Limited , 
England 2012 at 242. 
75 Final Report of the Senate Committee, Children: The Silenced Citizens (April 2007) at   
226-37 online:www.fncfcs.com/docs/Children_TheSilentCitizens_April2007.pdf .  
76 Supra note 66 at 58 and 59. 
77 Supra note 66 at 59. 
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Despite not being explicitly legislated in Canada’s domestic law, Canada’s ratification of 
CRC demonstrates that Canada represents to the world that it intends on holding its laws 
accountable to the children’s rights standards as set out in the CRC, whether or not those 
intentions have been realized.78  The same is true for UNDRIP. However, UNDRIP is a  
Declaration and not a Convention, and therefore arguably less persuasive a tool in the 
international law context. By way of example, in child welfare cases in Saskatchewan, 
the courts have not challenged cases wherein it has been argued that independent counsel 
be appointed for a child or youth; however, the availability for child counsel in all cases 
directly involving a child is not guaranteed.79 
The preamble of the CRC, adopted directly from the Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child,80 states that “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs 
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after 
birth."81  This statement articulates that children’s rights differ from those of adults.  This 
difference becomes explicit when we look at judicial decisions relating to children and 
youth.  In the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision of R. v. D.B.82 the court found 
that the presumption of reduced moral culpability for children and youth was in fact a 
principle of fundamental justice:83  																																																								
78 SEE Final Report of the Senate Committee, supra note 75. Canada has taken the position that 
instead of specifically legislating to include the provisions of the CRC in domestic law that it will 
ensure that domestic law does not conflict with the provisions in the CRC.  However, concerns 
have been expressed regarding whether parliament and the legislature have actually ensured that 
domestic legislation complies with the provisions of the CRC.  
79 Sheri Woods, Personal Interview,  Saskatoon Saskatchewan. August 2016. 
80 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, GA Res 1386 (XIV), UNGAOR, 16th Sess, Supp No 16, 
UN Doc A/4354, (1959) at 19.  
81 Supra note 3. 
82 R. v. D.B., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2008 SCC 25 [D.B.]. 
83 SEE ibid at para 74. “The remaining issue, therefore, is whether the presumption of an adult 
sentence in the onus provisions is consistent with the principle of fundamental justice that young 
people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability.  In my view, they are not.  
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[82] A young person should receive, at the very least, the same procedural benefit 
afforded to a convicted adult on sentencing, namely, that the burden is on the Crown 
to demonstrate why a more severe sentence is necessary and appropriate in any given 
case.  The onus on the young person reverses this traditional onus on the Crown and 
is, consequently, a breach of s. 7.  
 
The rationale for the distinction between adult sentencing and youth sentencing rested on 
the view that children and youth by reason of age have diminished moral culpability.84 
The child liberationist view, which became predominant during the birth of the 
civil rights and feminist movements of the 1960s, argues that children should hold equal 
rights to those of adults.85 Archard criticizes this perspective, advocating, instead, the 
modest collectivist view,86 which posits that there is a balance between the rights children 
hold and the responsibility of the state to rear children. Archard’s position raises the 
question of whether state interference in the upbringing of a child denigrates 
individualism. Guggenheim has argued that state interference does denigrate 
individualism,87 suggesting that the best place for a child to be brought up is in the care of 
their immediate family with very limited state intervention:  
But “the child is not the child of the state” and it is important in a free society to 
maintain the rich diversity of lifestyles, which is secured by permitting families a 
large measure of autonomy in the way in which they bring up their children.88 
 
The family’s role in the upbringing of a child is highly respected and supported in 
western-style liberal democracies, and is often based on the premise that parents have 																																																																																																																																																																					
They deprive D.B. of this presumption by putting the onus on him to justify his continued 
entitlement to the presumption, rather than on the Crown to demonstrate why it no longer applies 
to D.B., thereby allowing him to be sentenced as an adult.” 
84 Supra note 82. 
85 C. R. Margolin, “Salvation versus Liberation: The Movement for Children's Rights in a 
Historical Context” (1978) Social Problems, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 441-452. 
86 Supra note 66 at 178. 
87Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights (Boston; Harvard University Press, 
2005) at 174-81, 192-212.  
88 Supra note 87. 
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traditionally held rights over their children.89 Hale argues that it is equally the case that 
children are the product of the state, suggesting, “[the child] too is a person endowed with 
individual rights. If her family does not respect these rights, the state may have a positive 
obligation to step in to protect her.”90 It has been further suggested that the role of state 
involvement runs deeper than a protectionist role: 
It would be a mistake to see the state in merely ‘negative’ child protectionist terms 
as only a guardian of the child against abuse, which acts by intervening into the 
family and removing the child from any detected abusive situation. The state should 
also serve as a positive guarantor that every child within its jurisdiction enjoys a 
minimally decent upbringing.91 
 
Children’s rights as they relate to parental rights can be limited in certain situations. In 
the case of neglect or abuse, the state has a positive obligation to protect the child and the 
child’s right against those harms. The B.(R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of metro Toronto92 
decision, although monumental for its constitutionalization of parental rights,93 did 
support the proposition of state intervention in situations where the best interest of the 
child, in particular the life of an infant, was at risk. 
 In the context of child welfare in Saskatchewan, the issue arises as to whether the 
state interferes with Indigenous families more than with non-Indigenous families based 
on western concepts of child rearing, and, if so, whether this has resulted in the current 
climate of excessive state intervention in Indigenous families’ lives.94 Additionally, 
Indigenous children represented by lawyers in child welfare cases may not appropriately 																																																								
89 James G. Dwyer, “Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents’ Rights” (1994) 82 Cal. L. Rev. 
90 Supra note 66 at 355. 
91 Supra note 87 at 216. 
92 B.(R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metro Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 
1[B.R.]. 
93 Mark Carter, “"Debunking" parents' rights in the Canadian constitutional context”(2008) 86 
Can Bar Rev 479 at 491. 
94 Supra note 87 at 248.  
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be represented due to lawyer bias with respect to the Indigenous child’s relationship to 
their culture and community. Systemic issues such as poverty, which have substantiated 
apprehensions based on neglect, have been used to legitimize state intervention in 
families’ lives and essentially trump parental rights to raise children.95 Guggenheim 
argues that parental rights are too frequently trumped by “children’s rights”, or what a 
state deems to be a child’s right. Guggenheim’s argument relates to Saskatchewan’s child 
welfare crisis in that the province may be inappropriately removing children based on a 
very western concept of children’s rights. Ultimately, western concepts of child rearing 
and regard for children’s rights in an individual framework expose Indigenous children to 
higher incidence of state intervention than non-indigenous children, contributing to a vast 
overrepresentation of Indigenous child apprehensions in Saskatchewan. 
3.2 WILL THEORY AND INTEREST THEORY MODELS 
 Theoretical debates within the literature surrounding what it means to suggest that 
children have rights have yet to reach a consensus:  
If children’s rights have a special nature because of the very identity of children as 
rights-holders, then the failure to determine what this means in theoretical terms 
suggests critical difficulties for working with children’s rights in the sphere of legal 
practice.96 
 
Ferguson suggests that the problem with children’s rights is not the concept of children’s 
rights per se (like scholars such as Guggenheim would suggest) but that we do not have a 
child-centered model that can conceptualize children’s rights in a utilitarian way.97 
Therefore, the argument that the “theoretical basis of children’s rights [is] intimately 
																																																								
95 Ibid.  
96 Lucinda Ferguson, “Not Merely Rights for Children but Children’s Rights: the theory gap and 
the assumption of the importance of children’s rights” (2013) 21 Int’l J of Children’s Rts.  
97 Ibid at 95. 
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connected to their legal implementation” 98 exists.  In the decision-making context of 
child welfare cases, how we characterize children’s rights can strongly influence the 
outcomes for children: 
We have all these procedures and ways of operating that people don’t say, “wait 
hang on a second, there is something fundamentally flawed about this system” 
even though it is a system that is operating on the backs of Indigenous children 
and families.  It is self- perpetuating now.  So as long as there is a certain level of 
bias - the system will continue to perpetuate itself. 
… 
If people are not being critical in analyzing what their role is in the [child welfare 
system]…. The system will continue to perpetuate itself, particularly a system that 
is premised on un-interrogated bias, discrimination and racism. 
… 
There is unregulated power in the child welfare system at all levels, from intake 
workers, managers and in the legal system as well.99 Raven Sinclair 
 
Some will theorists argue that if children cannot conceptualize or do not possess the 
capacity to understand their rights, they cannot properly be described as possessing a 
right. This theory is based on the concept that if one does not possess the capacity to 
waive one’s right, one does not properly hold a right, suggesting that “[t]he individual 
who has the right is a small scale sovereign.”100 Conversely, interest theorists claim that a 
child’s lack of competency to hold a right does not exclude that child from holding an 
interest. By shifting the focus from rights to interests, will theorists’ arguments that 
children are incompetent and therefore cannot hold rights is overcome.  
 Children’s lack of development, maturity and capacity does not preclude children 
from being rights bearers. However, critics of interest theory for children’s rights have 
suggested that, in order to hold an interest right, the rights bearer must realize that 
																																																								
98 Supra note 66 at 182. 
99 Supra note 11. 
100 H.L.A. Hart, “Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory”, at 183.
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interest. Therefore, if a child cannot realize their interest they cannot hold a right.101 
Cowden suggests that “[i]nterest theory necessitates that the right-holder have the 
competence to realize the right in order for the interest to be of sufficient importance to 
impose duties and restrict the liberties of others.”102 Cowden identifies this concern as 
follows:  
[I]nterest theory allows the power to enforce a claim to reside outside the claim-
holder; therefore the competency to enforce or to waive is no longer necessary 
to hold a right. What interest theorists have not done is to demonstrate that the 
competence to realise the claim is also unnecessary.  
From this, it follows that if a child does not have the competence to realise the 
benefit to which the claim pertains, the interest may not qualify as of sufficient 
importance to be protected. 
Determining whether one holds a right under interest theory is therefore a balance 
between (a) the claim-holder's interest, (b) the claim-holder's competence, and (c) 
the cost to others of bearing the duty.103 
 
Children’s rapidly evolving capacity makes the requirement that children hold the 
capacity to recognize their rights problematic.104 As children evolve towards adulthood, 
their ability to possess rights adapts as they gain capacity to realize those rights. Cowden, 
however, suggests that, in order to restrict the liberty of others (such as parents), the duty 
may rest on the state to pass laws that restricts parents’ liberties with respect to their 
children 105   
 In child welfare cases, this limitation of the interest theory model of children’s 
rights cannot fulfill the needs of children.  For example, infants may not have the 
capacity to understand that they have a right to food, but they clearly have an interest in 
being fed.  In this sense the idea that children must be able to conceptualize their interest 																																																								
101 Mhairi Cowden, “Capacity, Claims and Children’s Rights” Contemporary Political Theory 
Vol. 11, 4, 362–380.  
102 Ibid at 374. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Supra note 101 at 364. 
105 Ibid at 378. 
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in order to hold a right exposes already vulnerable people by limiting their interest based 
on capacity. In the context of child welfare, children must be protected from harms, 
which may regularly involve state interference in a child’s life, regardless of whether or 
not the child can conceptualize a particular right or interest. As will be further discussed, 
children can, and do, hold rights within both will and interest frameworks. Limiting 
children’s rights to one model over the other in no way improves children’s rights.  
3.3 RIGHTS REFLECTED IN THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
 The CRC expresses three different children’s rights: participation rights—rights 
wherein the child has a voice with respect to a particular outcome or event, protective 
rights—rights that have inherently paternalistic characteristics and provision rights. 
Participation rights more strongly align with children’s rights and will theory approaches. 
Protective rights more closely align with concepts of the best-interest and interest theory. 
Protective rights are distinct to children. Adults are not often the subjects of protective 
rights, as that would infringe on the libertarian view of what it means to be adult.  
Ultimately, we do not limit adults from making bad decisions; being free to make bad 
decisions is a part of what it means to be adult. Protective rights and participation rights 
appear to be competing rights within the CRC, which is most obvious when comparing 
Article 3.1 and Article 12.1. Specifically, Article 3.1 reads as follows:  
3.1 In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.106 [Emphasis added] 
Article 3.1 of the CRC expresses protective rights for children. Specifically, in matters 
that concern decisions regarding children, the best interest of the children shall be a 
																																																								
106 Supra note 3 (Article 3.1.)  
34	
 
primary consideration.107  The CRC however also sets out participation rights: 
12.1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, 
the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity of the child.108 
Article 12.1 expresses a participatory right insofar as the child is able to communicate 
their preference and opinions with regard to particular circumstance. The child’s 
expressed views do not necessarily determine the outcome.  Additionally, the language in 
Article 12.1, “child who is capable,” limits the right based on whether the decision-
making body believes the child is capable of forming an opinion on the matter that can be 
expressed and has been extended to lawyers representing children.  As will be further 
discussed, lawyers in Saskatchewan representing children in child welfare cases 
determine what advocacy model they will adopt in relation to their child client based on 
their assessment of the child’s capacity to communicate. How a decision-making body is 
to weigh a child’s opinion is also restricted by the language: “the views of the child being 
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”109 Although 
Article 12 may appear to be a participatory right in the sense that some children will be 
able to “weigh in” on their views of the process, ultimately the decision maker (court) 
decides what weight to give to that child’s opinion. Therefore, the participation rights as 
expressed in Article 12.1 are limited insofar as an adult will decide whether allowing for 
																																																								
107Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (AG), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 
2004 SCC 4.  
108 Supra note 3 (Article 12.1.) 
109 As will be discussed at greater length, the counsel for children and youth advocacy program in 
Saskatchewan discretionally appoints counsel for children, with a mandate that is limited to child 
welfare cases. The mandate partially fulfils Article 12 of the CRC. Independent Counsel 
maintains the discretion to identify and choose how he/she will advocate based on counsel’s 
independent assessment on the child’s ability to communicate their wishes. For example, if the 
child is pre-verbal counsel will maintain an amicus curaie role. If the child is communicative 
counsel is supposed to maintain an instructional role based on the programs mandate. 
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that child’s expression is in the child’s best interest.  
However, compelling children to do what they do not believe is in their best interest 
may also not be in their best interest.110 In this sense, Article 3 and Article 12 actually 
support each other. The child’s participatory right is limited by whether or not a decision 
maker or body believes that participation is in the best interests of the child and on what 
level a decision maker or body decides to weight that participation. For children involved 
in child welfare apprehensions, the child’s participation can be used as a tool to inform 
the welfare rights of the child, namely the best interest of the child. The problematic 
feature of this relationship is that the weight given to a child’s voice is subject to the 
scrutiny of an adult. This relationship is particularly relevant in the Indigenous child 
welfare context where the Indigenous child may voice an opinion that an adult lawyer 
deems to be contrary to the child’s best interest based on the lawyer’s cultural bias. The 
lawyer in the child-client –lawyer relationship may stigmatize the evidence based on 
cultural difference heard by the judge—ultimately distorting the court’s role in 
determining what is in the child’s best interest.111 The effects of the current use of 
counsel in Saskatchewan who represent Indigenous children in child welfare cases will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter (6) of this thesis.  
																																																								
110 Supra note 101. 
111  SEE Dale Hensley,  “Role and responsibilities of counsel for the child in Alberta: A 
practitioner’s perspective and a response to Professor Bala” (2006). Alb L. Rev. , 43, 871–903.  
and  Nicholas Bala et al. “Controversy about the role of children’s lawyers: Advocate or best 
interest guardian? Comparing practices in two Canadian Jurisdictions with different policies for 
lawyers” (2013) Family Court Rev. 5, 681–697. This analysis is based on what advocacy model is 
adopted by the lawyer acting for the child in a child protection hearings.  If the lawyer adopts a 
traditional advocacy model, the child’s voice regardless of the lawyer’s perspective is put before 
the court.  If a best interest model is adopted by the lawyer, the child’s voice is ultimately reduced 
to the lawyers cultural and social perception of what is in the child best interest.  
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3.4 CHILDREN & INDIGENOUS RIGHTS BASED THEORY:  
COMMUNAL RIGHTS AND THE CHARTER 
In Australia and Canada, the forced removal of children to residential schools for 
several generations corroded the traditional child-rearing values and practices of 
many Indigenous individuals and communities. In both countries, very high rates of 
child removals continue within the child welfare system, and this continues to 
corrode Indigenous parenting skills, the passing on of culture and identity, and the 
very institution of the family.”112  
 
As previously identified, in Saskatchewan, 80 percent of children involved in child 
welfare cases are Indigenous. The current overrepresentation is in stark contrast for the 
1950s wherein approximately 1 percent of children in the child welfare system were 
Indigenous.113 Multiple factors stemming from colonization contribute to this over-
representation of Indigenous children, including systemic racism, poverty, reduced access 
to healthcare and education, and poor housing.114 While these factors will not be 
discussed here, concepts of rights and rights theory for Indigenous children must be 
considered in relation to child welfare.  
 Attention must be drawn to the relationship of Indigenous individual and group 																																																								
112 Marlyn Bennett, Cindy Blackstock & Richard De La Ronde. “A literature review and 
annotated bibliography on aspects of Aboriginal child welfare in Canada 2nd Ed”  (Ottawa: First 
Nations Child and Family Caring Society, 2005) online:  www.fncfcs.com/docs/ 
AboriginalCWLitreview_2ndEd.pdf relationship based on self-determination. 
113 Ibid. 
114 For factors contributing to the overrepresentation of indigenous children in child apprehension 
cases SEE Galley, V. Summary Review of Aboriginal Over-representation in the Child 
Welfare System. Prepared for: Saskatchewan Child Welfare Review Panel, 2010at 50: 
“Consistent with national data patterns, Aboriginal children in Saskatchewan are 
dramatically over represented in the child welfare system although the reasons for this over 
representation are not well understood and further research is needed.  If the evidence from 
national studies also applies to Saskatchewan, then the over representation could be 
explained by neglect which is fuelled by poverty, inadequate housing and substance 
misuse. Statistics for Saskatchewan show that poverty levels for First Nations are higher 
for those people residing on reserve than off reserve and that First Nations are more likely 
to live in inadequate housing than other Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal persons. In addition, 
while reliable incidence rates of substance misuse among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
persons in Saskatchewan was not available, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations 
cites it as a substantial driver of child welfare neglect reports”. 
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rights in the context of the Charter. Isaac discusses this tension in his account of section 
25 of the Charter and section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,115 1982:  
Section 25 is the "shield" that will protect the rights of aboriginal people from 
encroachment by the Charter. Caution, however, must be exercised in treaty 
negotiations and the judicial interpretation of section 25, so as not to allow the 
individual rights and freedoms of aboriginal people to become overshadowed by 
their collective rights. 116  
Isaac further states the following in relation to reconciling individual rights and 
collective rights in relation to the Charter:  
Nothing in section 25 or elsewhere in the Charter states or suggests that aboriginal 
people are not entitled to the full benefit of the individual rights and freedoms set 
out in the Charter. Whatever the impact of section 25, it appears that it must 
balance the protection of the collective rights of aboriginal people, as a distinct 
group, with the rights and freedoms held individually by aboriginal people and 
other Canadians.117 [Emphasis added] 
 
The concern raised by Isaac with regard to collective rights having the ability to 
overshadow individual rights is evident in child welfare apprehension cases. While s.35 
has legitimized the province entering into s.61 CFSA agreements with 17 different 
FNCFSA in Saskatchewan, the Charter-protected individual rights may conflict with 
																																																								
115 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11. Note 
section 35(1) reads as follows:  
35.(1).The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affirmed. 
 
116 Thomas Isaac "Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Challenge of the Individual and 
Collective Rights of Aboriginal People" (2002) 21 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 431 at 
432. Note section 25 reads as follows:  
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as 
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to 
the aboriginal peoples of Canada including 
 (a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 
October 7, 1763; and 
 (b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so 
acquired.  
117 Thomas Isaac  Supra note 115 at 437. 
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Indigenous communal rights.118 Therefore, the framework for recognizing individual 
children’s rights rests within the CRC, which remains the framework for ensuring 
legislative compliance but not specific law. Carter states, “[s]ection 35 protections could 
be drawn into this kind of scenario where Charter rights are used to challenge federal or 
provincial government activity that respects or implements section 35 rights.”119 In 
Saskatchewan cases, where it has been argued that counsel should be appointed, the 
courts have not opposed applications for appointment of counsel for the children, likely 
out of awareness of the CRC and in particular Article 12.120 However, this practice tends 
to be limited to city centers where counsel is available, and as will be further discussed, is 
not readily used in cases of children who reside on reserve or in remote parts of the 
province.121 Additionally, this practice is Euro-Canadian centered and presumes that the 
appointment of counsel satisfies Article 12 of the CRC with respect to Indigenous 
children and now UNDRIP. The following cases provide examples of the tensions 
between individual rights and communal interests of Indigenous children subject to child 
welfare decisions. 
(A) RE R.T ET AL: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AS PARAMOUNT 
 Three decisions—Racine v. Woods, Winnipeg (Child and Family Services) v. M.A., 
122 and Re R.T et al.123— highlight the tension between individual rights and communal 
																																																								
118 SEE Re R.T et al. (2005), 248 D.L.R. (4h) 303 (Sask. Q.B.). 
119 Mark Carter, “An Analysis of the “No Hierarchy of Rights” Doctrine” 12 Rev. Const. Stud. 19 
2006-2007 at page 46. 
120 Supra note 79. 
121 Notably, access to counsel in Saskatchewan in typically limited to larger city centres.  
Identified in interview by the Director of the CFC program was that most requests for counsel 
come from Regina and Saskatoon. 
122 Winnipeg (Child and Family Services) v. M.A., 2002 MBQB 209 (CanLII), (2002), 165 Man. 
R. (2d) 279 (Q.B.) [M.A.]. 
123 Re R.T et al. (2005), 248 D.L.R. (4h) 303 (Sask. Q.B.) [Re R.T.]. 
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rights.  In all three decisions, the courts valued permanency (the child remaining in one 
home, usually under a permanent order under the CFSA which promotes the possibility 
of adoption) over communal rights. In Racine v. Woods, a 1983 SCC decision, the court 
focused on security of the child being paramount to the child’s future identity: 
However, adoption-given that the adoptive home is the right one and the trial 
judge has so found in this case-gives the child secure status as the child of two 
loving parents. While the Court can feel great compassion for the respondent, 
and respect for her determined efforts to overcome her adversities, it has an 
obligation to ensure that any order it makes will promote the best interests of 
her child. This and this alone is our task.124 
 
The focus on the individual remains the standard today, regardless of the costs to the 
identity of the child and the health of the child’s community. Sinclair notes that the 
decision has had lasting implications:  
I actually agree with the premise that children deserve to have a permanent home 
where they are safe, loved and cared for.  That is ideal.  But the system as it is set 
up, undermines that ideal, all that decision [Racine v. Woods] did was it gave 
more power to the courts to take children away indiscriminately, and that what 
Racine v. Woods, did.125 Raven Sinclair 
 
In the Winnipeg (Child and Family Services) v. M.A. decision, Justice Beard 
perpetuates the courts’ preference for individual rights over community rights:  
This is a case about an aboriginal child who is being denied her right to a 
permanent, secure family because the aboriginal agency and the band’s 
community committee have vetoed any such placement. The reason for the veto 
arises from a desire to stop the removal of aboriginal children from their cultural 
heritage. While a laudable goal, its dogmatic application is counterproductive and 
unfair. The tragedy in this case is that the best plan for the child, which would see 
her placed with a permanent family, has been rejected for historical and political 
reasons that have nothing to do with her case. The irony is that, in trying to make 
up for past wrongs to aboriginal children and past discrimination towards the 
aboriginal community, more wrongs are being committed and the discrimination 
against individual aboriginal children goes on in another form, this time 
perpetuated by the aboriginal agency and the band community committee. While 
non-aboriginal children are offered a permanent adoptive family, aboriginal 																																																								
124  Racine v. Woods [1983] 2 S.C.R. 173 at 189. 
125 Supra note 11. 
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children continue to be offered the lesser option of a foster family, which lacks 
the permanence and security that would come with an adoption.126 
 
Justice Beard’s comments raise serious concerns.  First, it suggests that the “best plan” 
for the child has been rejected on the basis of historical and political reasons.  However, 
these comments rest in the western framework of what that particular judge deems to be 
in the best interest of the child.  The concept of “best plan” relied upon fails to address 
the possible loss of identity issues that the child may face in the future. Secondly, the 
court concludes that discrimination against individual Aboriginal children goes on in 
another form, this time perpetuated by the Aboriginal Agency. Justice Beard’s comments 
suggest that the individual child is discriminated against because they will not be adopted 
into a presumably white family, but will, instead, float in and out of foster homes until 
the age of majority.  The decision fails to consider that, while it may be the case that 
foster families lack the permanence and stability of an adoptive family, the concerns of 
the First Nation that the child will potentially permanently lose their cultural identity are 
significant.  It also fails to address the systemic issues regarding poverty, lack of social 
services and funding for preventive services, which would reduce the number of children 
apprehended and facilitate finding appropriate culturally-sensitive placements for 
Indigenous children.127  
																																																								
126 Supra note 122 at para 1. 
127 SEE  “Aboriginal Children in Care: Report to Canada’s Premiers” (Prepared by: Aboriginal 
Children in Care Working Group, 2015) online: 
http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/phocadownload/publications/aboriginal_children_in_care_report
_july2015.pdf.,  AND Blackstock, C., Cross, T., George, J., Brown, I, & Formsma, J. 
Reconciliation in child welfare: Touchstones of hope for Indigenous children, youth, and families. 
Ottawa, ON, Canada: First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada / (Portland, OR: 
National Indian Child Welfare Association, 2006.) online: 
http://www.fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/docs/Touchstones_of_Hope.pdf AND Sinha, V. 
, Kozlowski, A. (2013). The Structure of Aboriginal Child Welfare in Canada. The International 
Indigenous Policy Journal, 4(2)  online: http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol4/iss2/2 
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  In Re R.T et al., Madam Justice Ryan-Froslie faced Charter arguments with respect 
to five Indigenous children apprehended by the Saskatchewan MSS. Ultimately, the court 
decided that long-term and permanent placement orders were in the children’s best 
interest; however, the court was also faced with constitutional questions it identified 
during the course of the litigation, resulting in the appointment of counsel for the 
children.  In setting out the facts of the case, J. Ryan-Froslie stated the following:  
All the children in issue here are members of, or entitled to be members of, the 
Sturgeon Lake band. That band, and its child and family service agency, have 
refused to consent to the adoption of any of the children. They assert it is an 
"aboriginal right" to speak for their children and to be involved in their placement. 
They do not want the children adopted by non-aboriginals because they do not 
want them to lose contact with their aboriginal community or their culture. 
Placement of the children is dependent upon the constitutional validity of the 
"aboriginal right" asserted and whether the policy breaches the children's Charter 
rights to equality and to liberty and security of the person.128 
 
The FNCFSA argued that community and kinship care were integral to the protection of 
First Nations culture and that the community shared in the responsibility of the child-
rearing process.  As such,  s.35(1) of the Constitution could not be impaired by the CFSA 
without the explicit consent for adoption by the First Nation, as band consent was argued 
to be a s.35.1 protected right to self-government.129 Counsel for the children argued that 
the denial of a permanent order, which would allow for adoption of some of the children, 
infringed the children’s s.7 rights.  In identifying this infringement, counsel for the 
children argued that adoption promoted security and stability and, thus, was in the 
children’s best interest.  Counsel for the children adopted a best interest model of 
advocacy, which is presently not the representational model adopted by the province. 
																																																								
128 Supra note 123 at para 2. 
129 Supra note 123 at para 58. 
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J. Ryan-Froslie found that the children’s s.7 and s.15 Charter rights had been infringed 
because of the government policy allowing FNCFSA to veto the adoption of band 
member and band-eligible Indigenous children, that the policy was contrary to the 
principles of fundamental justice and was not saved by s.35(1). She further held that the 
First Nation’s ability to veto a permanent placement of a child was not supported in a 
section 35(1) claim to self-government, with very limited discussion on the evidentiary 
basis in coming to this conclusion. In conclusion, Madam Justice Ryan-Froslie stated the 
following:  
When permanent orders are made with respect to First Nations children, those 
children should have the same opportunity to be placed for adoption as other 
children. The policy prevents this. It breaches the children's s. 7 and 15 Charter 
rights and accordingly cannot stand. There shall be a declaration that the policy in 
issue is unconstitutional and the Department is directed to deal with First Nations 
children in a manner consistent with their best interests and to place them for 
adoption where appropriate without reference to the impugned policy.130 
 
The result of the Re R.T et al decision is the proposition that Indigenous children’s 
individual rights will trump Indigenous communities’ interests in maintaining the 
culture, language, and community of Indigenous children which remains the courts’ 
standard today in most cases involving the Ministry of Social Services and Indigenous 
children.  
 (B) HAMILTON HEALTH SCIENCES CORP. V. D.H: UNDERSTANDING COMMUNAL INTERESTS 
The Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H.131 decision takes a profoundly 
different view of individual rights in relation to community rights. Specifically, the court 
prioritized parental and communal rights above the child’s individual rights. The facts of 
the case involved an Indigenous child (J.J.) of the Six Nations of the Grand River Nation 																																																								
130 Supra note 123 at para 107. 
131 Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H., 2014 ONCJ 603A [Hamilton Health Sciences] 
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whose mother had removed her from chemotherapy treatment to seek traditional 
medicine.  The child’s leukemia was considered to have a 90 percent curable rate if 
treated with western medicine. It was presented in evidence that the treating physicians 
were unaware of any chance of survival without chemotherapy treatment. At issue in the 
case was whether “the Six Nations’ practice of traditional medicine is integral to its 
distinctive culture today” and whether “the practice is an aboriginal right for the purposes 
of subsection 35(1).”132 In conclusion Justice Edward held the following: 
 
[81] It is this court’s conclusion, therefore, that D.H.’s decision to pursue 
traditional medicine for her daughter J.J. is her aboriginal right.  Further, such a 
right cannot be qualified as a right only if it is proven to work by employing the 
western medical paradigm.  To do so would be to leave open the opportunity to 
perpetually erode aboriginal rights.133 
 
In a further endorsement of the decision134 Justice Edward states the following with 
respect to the child’s best interest: 
[4]   In this court’s view, this historical recital not only explains the reason 
aboriginal rights exist, it also speaks to the enduring legacy of aboriginal peoples 
and how the core tenets of their culture and society have allowed them to flourish 
for centuries.  One of these core tenets, and something this court is reminded of 
regularly in dealing with child protection cases involving the Haudenosaunee, is the 
ultimate respect accorded to their children.  They [children] are considered gifts 
from the Creator.  So it is then that, in considering both the facts of this case as 
expressed by the mother and the history as it relates to aboriginal peoples, it does 
no mischief to my decision to recognize that the best interests of the child 
remains paramount. [Emphasis added]135 
 
The above endorsement in many ways reconciles individual and communal rights by 
suggesting that the child’s individual rights and best interests are protected in the 
recognition of a s.35(1) protected aboriginal right. However, absent from the decision is 																																																								
132 Ibid at para 72.  
133 Ibid at para 81. 
134 Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H., 2015 ONCJ 229 (note different citation due to a 
publication of addendum addressing the ‘best interest of the child) 
135 Ibid at para 4.   
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any reference to J.J.’s wishes.  Further, unlike the Re R.T. case, the child was 
unrepresented.136  
 These cases are complex and a thorough evaluation of the cases is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  However, these cases are illustrative of how using an individual rights 
framework or communal rights framework can be reasoned by a decision maker to 
support an argument for the best interest of the child. The rights framework used 
potentially results in different outcomes. The effect of different frameworks on the 
courts’ decisions is critical to child welfare cases in Saskatchewan because a communal 
rights framework may better support the Indigenous children’s best interest in child 
welfare cases by supporting not only the child’s communal rights but also their individual 
rights.  Additionally, with respect to the use of lawyers representing children, the 
lawyers’ training and concept of rights will influence the outcome for the child.  If the 
lawyer advocates for a child from a primarily Euro-Canadian framework, loss of culture, 
community and identity will be perpetuated in the child welfare system.  As such, the 
lawyer’s involvement may reduce the Indigenous child’s voice in the process and while 
initially seen as fulfilling Canada’s obligations under the CRC in fact reduces the 
Indigenous child’s voice. Therefore, CRC implementation goes beyond simply assigning 
a lawyer to a child in the child welfare context, but rather assigning a lawyer or person 
(elder, community member or group of elders) that can advocate without being limited by 
cultural biases. 
																																																								
136 Although the 5 children in the Re R.T. decision were represented by counsel, counsel for those 
children advocated on a best interest approach rather than an instructional advocacy approach.  
While some of the R.T. children were very young, the older children were of an age where they 
could have communicated their wishes with the court. 
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CHAPTER 4: ARTICLE 12 IN THE CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
This chapter identifies how Article 12 of the CRC has been implemented in 
Canada and in other jurisdictions and what role advocates have assumed in child welfare 
cases.  As well, this chapter examines Canada’s commitment to implementing the CRC in 
a meaningful way in child welfare cases and describes the current landscape of 
implementation in the Canadian context.  The CRC as it relates to Indigenous children 
could be seen as another westernized document that lacks Indigenous voice; however, 
while the CRC is often interpreted based on the individual child’s rights, it does not 
expressly identify the individual child’s rights as superseding the child’s communal 
interests. Additionally in concert with UNDRIP the CRC arguably has the ability to 
promote Indigenous children’s access to justice. This chapter identifies what advocacy 
models support Indigenous children’s access to justice. 
Canada faces many challenges in the enforcement of its international commitments 
to the CRC. Despite having ratified the CRC, the Convention has not been explicitly 
legislated federally, provincially or territorially. The 2007 Final Report of the Senate 
Committee (2007 Final Report) criticized Canada’s legislative inaction: 
..[D]espite federal government assurances that it has reviewed existing laws and 
that Canada is in compliance with a Convention, if no legislation directly 
incorporates the terms of the Convention, what recourse is available to a child, 
adult, or institution that does not believe that Canada’s laws are in compliance with 
its international human rights commitments?  At the present time, no body or 
government other than the relevant UN human rights treaty body has a mandate to 
respond to such concerns. 137 
 
The 2007 Final Report identifies that only a UN human rights treaty body has the explicit 
mandate to respond to Canada’s obligations in relation to the CRC. Without express 
																																																								
137 Supra note 75 at13.  
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legislation that incorporates the CRC’s articles, there is concern as to how the CRC can 
apply to domestic law.  In Canada, the CRC is periodically referenced by the courts as a 
means of interpreting or reinforcing Canada’s legislative framework, but never in the 
context of being an authority of explicit law.138  Lawyers advocating for children in 
Saskatchewan identify that judges in city centers  typically do not question counsel’s 
authority to appear on behalf of a child in child welfare cases due to awareness of the 
CRC.  However, the involvement of counsel is limited based on the judge’s preference.139   
The CRC Committee on the Rights for the Child is a UN body responsible for 
ensuring ratifying nations implement the Articles of the CRC.140  Ratified countries are 
required to submit reports every five years on how CRC rights are being implemented.141  
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations 2012 Report 
describes what measures have been undertaken in Canada (federally, provincially and 
territorially) to enhance the implementation of the CRC. It is not entirely clear from the 
report exactly what coordination has been taken by the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments; however, it is clear that no national effort has been taken to ensure the 
CRC’s provisions are directly implemented into current and future statutes. A mechanism 
for ensuring that the implementation of international treaties occurs effectively is 
essential in the Canadian context to reduce the jurisdictional conflict that Canada often 
faces: 																																																								
138 See Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (AG), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 
76, 2004 SCC 4 at para 9 and 10 [Foundations].  Also see, Baker v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 75 [Baker]. 
139 This was emphasized by roster counsel during Counsel for Children and Youth training that 
occurred on October 15, 2016 at Wanuskewin Heritage site, Saskatoon Saskatchewan.  
140 Supra note 3.   
141 United Nations Human Rights office of the High Commissioner, Committee on the Rights of 
the Child  “Monitoring Children’s Rights” online: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIntro.aspx 
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…as soon as international treaty negotiations begin, measures should be initiated at 
home to ensure national awareness of the issues at stake and the obligations that 
may have to be undertaken by all levels of government in Canada.  Information 
about the negotiations should be available on relevant government websites, and 
consultations with other jurisdictions, Parliament and other stakeholders should 
begin as soon as is practicable.142 [Emphasis added] 
 
First Nations and Métis people are central stakeholders and, thus, need to be included in 
the negotiations. One recommendation of the 2007 Final Report concerning the lack of 
jurisdictional coordination suggests “Parliament and the provinces and territories should 
certainly be informed as soon as human rights treaty negotiations begin in order to get 
consultations under way.”143 Further, the 2007 Final Report recommends “[t]hat 
responsibility for the Continuing Committee of Officials on Human Rights be transferred 
immediately from the Department of Canadian Heritage to the Department of Justice”144.  
The current framework for negotiations limits any potential legal oversight on the 
implementation of treaty obligations. Transferring responsibility to the Department of 
Justice would signal a legal element to the CRC. Without legal oversight, a piecemeal 
approach to satisfying CRC obligations continues; one example being the Office of the 
Children’s Advocate in Saskatchewan and the Counsel for Children and Youth program 
in Saskatchewan (CFC). Both offices purportedly meet some of Saskatchewan’s CRC 
commitments, but as will be discussed at great length in Chapter 5, availability of 
services is ad hoc in many instances and arguably are less available for Indigenous 
children, families and communities.  
 Bob Pringle, Saskatchewan’s Children’s Advocate, explains that the disconnect 
between different organizations means that some agencies are unable to access vital 																																																								
142 Supra note 75 at 227 
143 Supra note 75.  
144 Supra note 75 at 227. 
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information, such as the reports filed to the CRC Committee for the Rights of the Child: 
“[t]he provinces and territories all send their assessments to the [federal government] and 
I cannot get a commitment as to why we [Children’s Advocate] cannot see those 
[reports]….  And that’s what goes on to the UN about the state of Canada’s children.”145. 
The result is a lack of transparency as to how Canada is actually measuring up 
internationally with its commitment to implementing the CRC and impact on Indigenous 
children. Some countries, like Norway, have gone so far as to expressly indicate that the 
articles set out in the CRC “shall take precedence over any other legislative provisions 
that conflict with them,”146 ultimately mandating that the CRC is applicable. 
 The criticism against directly implementing the CRC into federal legislation is that 
the current legislative infrastructure may not enable Canada to comply with the CRC 
provisions and the provisions themselves could be seen as ambiguous or open to different 
interpretation, Additionally, the CRC’s provisions are broad-based principles that relate 
to the protection of children’s rights, and as such, direct implementation may potentially 
cause confusion regarding the meaning of certain provisions.147  However, without 
implementation the overarching concern remains that Canada’s international 
commitments are not enforceable in Canadian law.148 Without expressly implementing 
the CRC, courts are left to argue that the rights set out in the CRC are unwritten 
constitutional principles149 that can be assessed to support a judicial finding but not as 
																																																								
145 Bob Pringle. Personal interview. Saskatchewan Children’s Advocate. July 27, 2016. 
146 David Thor Bjorgvinsson, The Intersection Between International and Domestic Law, (2015, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Cheltenham UK) at 143. 
147 Supra note 75 at 231 
148 Baker, supra note 133.  
149 Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?” 
(Lord Cooke Lecture, delivered at the Lord Cooke lecture, Wellington, New Zealand, 1 
December 2005), [unpublished]. 
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explicit law.150  Limiting the CRC to an unwritten constitutional principle does not ensure 
consistent application. Simply hoping that Canadian federal, provincial and territorial 
legislation complies with the CRC is ineffective for children, families and communities.  
 Risk lies in the fact that a court faced with a children’s rights issue that does not fall 
squarely into Canada’s written law could be forced to assess that issue without explicit 
authority. Thus, children may be subject to legal uncertainty and varying outcomes on 
similar issues. This is precisely what is occurring with respect to the Counsel for Children 
and Youth Office: most FNCFSA do not access the services of the office, which means 
that the children in their authority have different legal processes and outcomes than 
children in the provincial system. Request for legal child counsel typically comes form 
front-line Ministry or FNCFSA workers.  It has been suggested that FNCFSA workers 
are fearful of requesting counsel as Saskatchewan’s Counsel for Children and Youth 
program is perceived as been part of the provincial government and not independent from 
the provincial government.151 As Betty Ann Pottruff, Director of the Counsel for Children 
and Youth program (CLC), describes the uneven access to the CLC program, stating, 
“[t]he majority of requests for counsel are coming from social services but I am getting 
some from First Nations Agencies from across the province.”152  																																																								
150 Supra note 149 In this paper the Chief Justice, describes some of the concerns and criticisms 
regarding unwritten constitutional principles.  In describing how constitutional principles can be 
identified she states the following: “The answer is that they can be identified from a nation’s past 
custom and usage; from the written text, if any, of the nation’s fundamental principles; and from 
the nation’s international commitments. Unwritten principles are not the arbitrary or subjective 
view of this judge or that. Rather, they are ascertained by a rigorous process of legal reasoning. 
Where, having regard to convention, written provisions and internationally affirmed values, it is 
clear that a nation and its people adhere to a particular fundamental principle or norm, then it is 
the court’s duty to recognize it. This is not law-making in the legislative sense, but legitimate 
judicial work” (at page 20). 
151 Supra note 8. 
152 Betty Ann Pottruff, Telephone Interview. Director Counsel for Children and Youth, August 
2016. 
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 Ultimately the risk for varying outcomes is in direct violation of the CRC. As the 
Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children (CCRC) notes, conflicts between the 
federal, provincial and territorial governments regarding jurisdiction should subside to 
ensure that legislation does expressly protect children’s rights:  
Laws that protect and fulfill children’s rights are essential for effective 
implementation. There is, however, no comprehensive law or policy for children. 
Canada has not taken steps to make the Convention or its core principles part 
of Canadian law. Furthermore, Canada has not undertaken a review of its 
legislation for compliance with the Convention since the ratification process 
two decades ago. Children are invisible in Canada’s constitution, including the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In some cases, courts have considered the 
Convention in their interpretation of Canadian laws, but in other cases Canadian 
courts have made decisions inconsistent with the Convention…Sometimes 
government officials argue that incorporating the Convention into Canadian 
law is not necessary because Canada already complies through existing 
policies. On other occasions, incorporation is rejected because it would require 
too many changes in existing laws and policies. These inconsistent responses to 
the suggestion of incorporation illustrate the need for greater clarity in the 
relationship between the Convention and Canadian law.153 [Emphasis added].  
 
The CCRC argues that failing to incorporate the articles of the CRC into Canadian law 
and failing to review Canada’s legislation for the purpose of confirming compliance at 
the provincial, federal and territorial level is a direct breach of Canada’s obligation to the 
implementation of the CRC.  The CCRC further argues that, because the CRC was 
ratified following the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,154 the Charter alone does not 
adequately protect children rights, as children’s rights will differ in some instances from 
adults’.155 The CCRC notes that the CRC’s lack of legal status contributes to Canada’s 
“inequitable treatment of children across the country, gaps in implementation, and 
severely limited means for children to seek redress when their rights are not 																																																								
153 Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children. Right in Principle, Right in Practice: 
Implementation of the CRC.(2011 at 11.   
154 Supra note 71. 
155Supra note 153 at 11. 
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respected.”156  
 The CRC’s lack of implementation is symptomatic of federalism:  
It is not the practice in any jurisdiction in Canada for one single piece of legislation 
to be enacted incorporating a particular international human rights convention into 
domestic law (except, in some cases, regarding treaties dealing with specific human 
rights issues, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war 
victims). Rather, many laws and policies, adopted by federal, provincial and 
territorial governments, assist in the implementation of Canada’s international 
human rights obligations.157  
 
Although there are issues with the incorporation of the CRC at a federal level and 
concern that matters concerning children generally fall under provincial jurisdiction, 
children’s advocate groups argue that both legal legitimacy of the CRC and a National 
Children’s Advocate or Commissioner is needed.158 Other countries with federal systems 
have given the CRC teeth through national incorporation. Other countries’ explicit 
incorporation of the CRC has signaled a commitment to children’s rights.159 The reliance 
on federalism is insufficient to support Canada’s failure to directly incorporate the CRC. 
Although Canada is regularly required to report to the United Nations regarding its 
compliance and implementation of the CRC, no international court is available to 
																																																								
156 Ibid. 
157 United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, Core document forming part of the 
reports of States Parties: Canada,HRI/CORE/1/Add.91, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human  Rights, Geneva, 12 January 1998, para. 138. Child and Youth 
Advocates, Submission to the Senate  
Standing Committee on Human Rights, Ottawa, 21 February 2005, p. 12, 
<parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/ commbus/senate/Com-e/huma-e/06mn-e.htm?>.   
158 Both individual advocates and the CCRC have outwardly expressed a need for both explicit 
CRC legislative incorporation and a National Children’s Advocate. ALSO, FNCFSA in 
Saskatchewan articulated in interviews that a national children’s advocate meets the federal 
governments responsibility with First Nations and Canada’s commitment to UNDRIP.  It is 
however notable that UNDRIP is not a treaty and therefore faces issues with respect to its legal 
status and its implementation into Canadian “law”.  
159 Norway, Argentina and South Africa have all incorporated the CRC into national domestic 
law. In the aforementioned counties where the CRC conflicts with domestic law, domestic law 
takes precedence.  
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effectively enforce those obligations.160 Additionally, and as was identified by several 
interviewees, the statistics in Saskatchewan may not adequately reflect the ongoing child 
welfare crisis. For instance, Pringle stated that, although the Minister of Social Services 
noted that Saskatchewan has “the lowest level of child poverty in Canada,” the statistics 
hide a substantial discrepancy: “[w]ell, we do if you are talking about non-Aboriginal 
children, but we have the highest discrepancy between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
children in the country. Are we satisfied with that?”161 As was identified by several 
interviewees, the MSS is increasingly using PSI (Persons of Sufficient Interest) orders162 
in child welfare cases: “PSI is a better look on your statistics because those kids are no 
longer in care.”163 If the MSS can find a PSI and custody is awarded to the PSI, the case 																																																								
160SEE David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 58 for 
discussion on the requirement of an international court to effectively enforce treaties ratified by 
nations.  
161 Supra note 145.  
162 Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11. [CFSA]. Section 23: 
Persons having sufficient interest 
23(1) Subject to subsection (2), where an application for a protection hearing has been 
made, the court may, on an oral or written request, by order designate as a person having 
a sufficient interest in a child: 
(a) a person who, in the opinion of the court, is a member of the child’s extended family; 
(b) where the child is a status Indian: 
(i) whose name is included in a Band List; or 
(ii) who is entitled to have his or her name included in a Band List; the chief of 
the band in question or the chief’s designate; or 
(c) any other person who is not a parent of the child but who, in the opinion of the court, 
has a close connection with the child. 
(2) Where a request pursuant to subsection (1) is made, the court: 
(a) may direct the person making the request to notify each parent and the department of 
the request within any time and in any manner that the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) shall consider the views, if any, of each parent and the department before making an 
order pursuant to subsection (1). 
(3) Where the court makes an order pursuant to subsection (1), the court shall give 
directions respecting the service of notices on the person designated as a person having a 
sufficient interest in a child. 
(4) A person designated pursuant to subsection (1) as a person having a sufficient interest 
in a child is a party to a protection hearing respecting that child. 
1989-90 cC-7.2 s23 
163 Glenda Cooney. Personal Interview. Past Deputy Children’s Advocate. Independent 
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no longer falls with in the statistics of the child being identified as being in care, 
improving the international perception and national perception in Saskatchewan.   
4.1 CANADIAN CASE LAW AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CRC 
The SCC has not been consistent in its interpretation of the CRC’s applicability. 
In Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Central Area) v. W. (K.L.),164 opposing opinions 
can be identified with respect to the legitimacy of the CRC. Conflicting opinions on the 
role of the CRC in SCC decisions is not unique to the Winnipeg Child and Family 
Services case.  Without a consistent legislative framework and provincial, territorial and 
federal legislation, a serious risk exists that children involved in child protection cases are 
not treated consistently. The differing opinions of the CRC applicability at the SCC level 
indicates the need for uniformity with respect to the provisions of the CRC.  In Canada 
Immigration v. Baker, the SCC held that, although the CRC is not explicitly incorporated 
into Canadian law, the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration in 
review of the circumstances:  
I agree with the respondent and the Court of Appeal that the Convention has not 
been implemented by Parliament. Its provisions therefore have no direct 
application within Canadian law. 
… 
 
Nevertheless, the values reflected in international human rights law may help 
inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial 
review.165 
 
The values and principles of the Convention recognize the importance of being 
attentive to the rights and best interests of children when decisions are made 
that relate to and affect their future. In addition, the preamble, recalling the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, recognizes that "childhood is entitled to 
special care and assistance". A similar emphasis on the importance of placing 																																																																																																																																																																					
Consultant for FNCFSA. July 2016. 
164 Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Central Area) v. W. (K.L.) 2000 SCC 48, 2000 CSC 48, 
2000 CarswellMan 469 [Winnipeg Child and Family Services]. 
165 Baker, supra note 138. 
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considerable value on the protection of children and their needs and interests is 
also contained in other international instruments. The United Nations Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child (1959), in its preamble, states that the child "needs 
special safeguards and care". The principles of the Convention and other 
international instruments place special importance on protections for children and 
childhood, and on particular consideration of their interests, needs, and rights. 
They help show the values that are central in determining whether this decision 
was a reasonable exercise of the H & C power.166 
 
In relation to Indigenous children, values reflected in UNDRIP, namely the importance of 
maintaining communal interests are also significant in ensuring the child’s right to 
‘voice’.  Courts interpreting ambiguity in the law discretionally apply the CRC when they 
feel it is beneficial and with no clear consistency.  Therefore, it is not mandated that a 
court faced with a children’s rights issue rely on the CRC at all or UNDRIP to the extent 
of Indigenous children. Legitimizing the CRC and UNDRIP in the Canadian context 
therefore requires a two-fold exercise: codifying the CRC and UNDRIP principles into 
domestic law and then addressing issues pertaining to the relationship of Indigenous 
rights within the framework of the CRC and UNDRIP.  
4.2 REPRESENTATIONAL MODELS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 In civil law jurisdictions, the CRC has been directly legislated for and forms a part 
of the country’s legal system and legislative framework.167  In common law jurisdictions, 
direct incorporation of the CRC is rare.168 Many common law jurisdictions, like Canada, 
use their international obligations, including the ratification of the CRC, to interpret 
current laws but not as explicit law. In a 1997 decision of the House of Lords, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson stated the following with regard to the CRC’s legitimacy: 																																																								
166 Supra note 165. 
167 UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Law Reform and the Implementation on the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child,(2007) online: 
http://www.unicefirc.org/publications/pdf/law_reform_crc_imp.pdf. at 5-9.  
168 Supra note 141. 
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[the] Convention has not been incorporated into English law. But it is 
legitimate…to assume that Parliament has not maintained on the statute book a 
power capable of being exercised in a manner inconsistent with the treaty 
obligations of this country.169 
 
Despite common law jurisdictions insistence that the CRC’s articles will inform current 
and future legislation, the participatory rights articulated in Article 12 are not effectively 
recognized worldwide.170  In 2005, Yale Law School conducted a survey (Yale Study) of 
250 countries and the mechanism by which children are heard in the context of child 
welfare hearings in those countries.171  The Yale Study concluded the following:  
For a substantial number of jurisdictions, representing 73.3% of children under 
the age of fifteen worldwide, research either revealed the country to be out of 
compliance with Article 12 or research findings were inconclusive.172 [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Article 12 of the CRC is the most controversial provision, as it explicitly provides 
children participatory rights in the decision-making processes.173 In the United 
States, for instance, the persistent controversy that children can possess 
independent rights from their parents has stifled the CRC’s ratification.174  
Guggenheim has offered an alternative position, suggesting that it is the provision 
rights that have stifled ratification, because the United States has counsel more 
readily available for children in child welfare cases.175 
 
Interpreting Article 12 is not easy. Open for interpretation are ambiguities in Article 12, 
																																																								
169 R v. [1997] UKHL 25. 
170 Jean Koh Peters, “How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings, in the  United 
States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and Areas for 
Further Study” (2006). Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2146 online: 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2146 . 
171 Ibid.  
172 Ibid at 967. 
173 Laura Lundy, “‘Voice’ is not enough: conceptualizing Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child” (2007) 33:6 British Educational Research Journal 927 at 
928. 
174 Paula S. Fass & Mary Ann Mason, eds., Introduction to Childhood in America (New York: 
NYU Press, 2000) at 609-10  wherein the editors state that the "[t]he idea of legal rights for 
children apart from those of their parents is relatively new and still very controversial for 
Americans." 
175 Supra note 87. 
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which include at what age is a child “capable of forming his or her own views,”176 what 
weight to give children’s views, the meaning of being “heard,”177 the meaning of  
“representative”178 and what is an “appropriate body.”179  Three possible vehicles for 
representation mentioned in Article 12 effectuate the child’s right to be heard: (1) 
directly, (2) through the use of a representative, or (3) through the appropriate body.180  
However, the CRC is “silent on the extent to which the child's views must be advocated 
for, as opposed to merely expressed. In addition, the CRC does not necessarily require 
that the child be a party to proceedings or that the child's representatives be a lawyer.”181 
Although child welfare is the subject of this thesis, Article 12 does not limit the 
children’s voice to child protection proceedings. The focus of Article 12 is on the child’s 
expressed views and not necessarily on the child’s best interest, although there may be an 
intersection between what is in the child’s best interest and their expressed views.182   
Interestingly, “[t]he CRC does not require that a child be mature enough to express a 
considered view in order to trigger this section.”183  
However, as the Yale study revealed, Article 12 is unevenly applied in the ratified 
countries: 
Roughly 35% of the jurisdictions surveyed (in which 44.2% of the world's 
children under age fifteen reside) do not have provisions for children to be 
heard in child protective proceedings, and slightly over 59% of the countries (in 																																																								
176 Supra note 170. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Supra note 170 at 969. 
181 Ibid. 
182 SEE David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (New York: Routledge, 1993). Note that 
Archard suggests that as the child approaches majority the intersection of best interest and 
expressed views will move closer together.  Therefore, the result of opposing a mature child on 
their expressed interest will not generally act in the child best interest.  
183 Supra note 170 at 974. 
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which 73.3% of the worldwide population of children live) fell into the three 
categories of child protective proceedings with no provisions for children to be 
heard, no evidence of child protective proceedings, or little or no information 
available.184 [Emphasis added] 
 
Despite being the most universally ratified international treaty, approximately three 
quarters of children worldwide reside in a jurisdiction where no mechanisms are available 
for a child to be heard.185 Only approximately 15 percent of the world's children live in 
jurisdictions that provide for representatives for children in child welfare proceedings. 186 
However, “[i]n the United States, while the laws provide for representatives for all 
children, many of those representatives do not focus on expressing the child's wishes to 
the court.”187 In Saskatchewan, Indigenous children in child welfare cases are the perfect 
example of inconsistent and inadequate satisfaction of Article 12. 
Once a child is apprehended in Saskatchewan, he or she is not automatically 
entitled to counsel or a representative. Instead, there are two models of representation: 
mandatory representation jurisdictions and discretionary representation jurisdictions.188 
Complicating matters further are the plural systems of government (Canada’s Federal-
Provincial-Territorial system) because whether a child receives a representative and can 
make independent submissions is controlled by the particular state, territory, or 
																																																								
184 Supra note 170 at 992. 
185 Ibid at 1030. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Supra note 170. Mandatory jurisdictions mandate that the child have a representative in the 
child welfare context, while discretionary jurisdictions (which represent the majority of 
jurisdictions world-wide) have some form of child protection legislation that includes the 
potential use of a representative. Appointment of counsel typically is by way of request by a party 
(Ministry, parent, person of interest) or by the court.  
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province.189 The lack of uniformity has been a contentious issue for Indigenous peoples 
in Canada. Indigenous children residing on reserve in Canada not only receive reduced 
funding for child and family services through the federal government, but also have 
inadequate access to resources that are mandated by the CRC.  Reduced access to a 
culturally appropriate representative in the child welfare context effectively marginalizes 
an already overly-marginalized group of children.190  
(A) MANDATORY JURISDICTIONS  
Norway has the most sophisticated model of child advocacy in the world. In 
response to the CRC, Norway implemented national legislation wherein children over the 
age of 7 in child protection hearings systematically have a right to be heard in the 
proceeding.191  Some children who are under the age of 7 are able to voice their opinions 
if granted special permission, which partially depends on the maturity of the child.192  All 
children in Norway over the age of 15 are entitled to free legal counsel, and children 
under 15 are appointed a spokesperson that will represent the child’s interests at a child 
protection hearing.193 The Norwegian model does not specify the use of a lawyer when 
appointing a spokesperson. However, by mandating that the Articles set out in the CRC 
																																																								
189 Canada, Australia and the USA have federal systems of government, wherein the particular 
province, territory or state has jurisdiction over child welfare.  Therefore each province, state or 
territory has its own unique legislation respecting children in child welfare proceedings.  
190 Jordan’s Principle aims to prevent Indigenous children from being denied prompt access to 
services because of jurisdictional disputes between different levels of government. Jordan’s 
Principle is a mechanism to prevent First Nations children from being denied equal access to 
benefits or protections available to other Canadians as a result of their Aboriginal status. Also, see 
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Assembly of First Nations v. 
Attorney General of Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development), 2011 CHRT 4 (CanLII), online: http://canlii.ca/t/fz6rz. *In depth discussion of 
funding discrepancies in Canada will be discussed in Part 2 of this research paper.  
191 Supra note 170 at 987 and 1058. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
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be directly incorporated into its legislative framework, Norway has taken at face value 
the urgency of direct implementation.  
While the Norwegian model is extensive, it may have its limits if applied directly 
in Saskatchewan. For example it mandates specific ages with respect to the 
representational model the lawyer (or representative) will use based on age. As such the 
representative is unable to use his or her discretion on whether they will take an 
instructional or amicus curiae role when advocating for the child if the child is over the 
age of 15.194 An additional limitation is that the Norwegian model allows for only one 
advocate for the child.  In relation to Indigenous children in Canada, another, equally 
valid, CRC implementation could be that the child be represented by a lawyer, 
community member, or a group of community members. Ultimately, adequate CRC 
implementations for Indigenous communities in Saskatchewan would allow for the 
Indigenous community to develop its own concept of satisfying the child’s rights to 
voice.  This would further support Canada’s obligations with respect to UNDRIP. 
Western-European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, France, Norway, and 
Sweden, have generally taken a holistic approach to child welfare that focuses on 
preventative care.195  Germany’s child welfare system does not focus on “risk” to the 
																																																								
194 Note that the instructional model and amicus model will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 5. 
195 K. Baistow and G. Wilford, “Helping Parents, Protecting Children: Ideas from Germany. 
(2000) Children and Society 14 343. and Saskatchewan Child Welfare Review Panel, For the 
Good of our Children and Youth; A New Vision, A New Direction” online: 
http://saskchildwelfarereview.ca/cwr-panel-report.pdf at 24. It is notable that Pringle identified 
Indigenous peoples as being reluctant to access the child welfare supports because their 
perception and experience has been that if they access services the MSS will take their children 
away:  
“A common theme is that indigenous people do not want to seek help because they are 
afraid that someone will take away their children away because that has been their 
experience.” SEE Bob Pringle. Supra note 145. 
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child as a threshold for state intervention, but rather focuses on a “perceived need” which 
includes, but is not limited to, a “risk” analysis.196 Germany’s prevention-oriented model 
on child welfare appears to lead to more satisfactory relationships between families and 
the state.197 Parents do not wait for a crisis situation to arise (loss of housing, instability, 
addictions and financial hardship) before requesting assistance from the state with respect 
to their child-rearing responsibilities,198 possibly because this preventative approach 
reduces a sense of failure by the parent and does not stigmatize the parent for seeking 
help.  As a result, parents and children access child welfare supports. This model has 
been criticized for not focusing enough on children’s individual rights or conflicts that 
may arise between parents and children.199 In isolation, preventative programming may 
be interpreted as reducing children’s rights and prioritizing parental needs. However, in 
the Western-European context, preventative programming is not used in isolation; rather 
it is partnered with the child’s right to be heard.200   
France similarly takes a voluntary approach to access to social services.  
Multidisciplinary teams are designed to provide preventative tools to families in need of 
support.201 Both Germany and France impose a positive duty on the state to intervene 
where a child is at risk of harm or neglect; however, the preventative measures in place 
for families in need of support are intended to reduce the numbers of families subject to 
crisis requiring state intervention. The preventative model is in stark contrast with the 
Canadian model of requiring a threshold for intervention that is primarily based on 																																																								
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legislated mandate.202 Pringle describes the threshold system in practice as problematic 
for Indigenous peoples: “The threshold system was forced upon First Nations and fails to 
address Indigenous needs.”203 Placing a positive obligation on a family to access child 
and family services does not diminish children’s rights, but rather supports a relational 
right between parent and child to access services without prioritizing parental rights over 
children’s rights or vice versa. Arguably, the Canadian threshold model discourages 
parents from seeking state assistance out of fear of harsh state consequences or the 
apprehension of their children.  As one FNCFSA director indicated in describing the 
impact of the threshold system on Indigenous families,  
Part of it is once you take a child out of their home and away from their parents it 
disengages them [the parents] so much as parents it is like something happens to 
them. When they lose their parental authority it is really hard to put back.  It is 
like you have stripped them of something inherent to them…when you look from a 
parental view they might not go [to court] because they feel there is no point, “I 
can’t go up against this child welfare regime, I’m going to lose so why even go, 
I’ve lost already”.  It is a sense of hopelessness.204 Confidential  
 
By contrast, Western-European countries’ preventative approach to child welfare helps to 
reduce the need for child apprehensions.205 In addition, if a child is apprehended and 
subject to court process, the ‘voice’ of the child becomes mandated for.  
How one perceives the role of the state in relation to child and parental rights 
determines the perception of this preventative model. Supporting families by making 
available support services could potentially promote children’s rights if the child’s voice 
is included in that process. Further, the infrastructure available to children who have been 
apprehended is supported by a system wherein apprehension is only considered in the 																																																								
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203 Supra note 145. 
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most extreme cases of neglect or abuse. This promotes not only the children’s right to be 
heard but also the children’s right in relation to parental rights and their communities’ 
rights. For Indigenous children in Saskatchewan, the model is described as “if you have 
contact you apprehend and ask questions later….the difference between having a 
preventative approach and interventative approach is that intervention is easier, there is 
not as much work.  You don’t have to work as hard at your job to deal with the cases.”206  
Informant interviews indicated that an Indigenous model of care would place additional 
focus on a preventative model of care, which would be accessible to Indigenous parents 
because it would limit the real fear that Indigenous families have of unnecessary state 
removal in situations where families simply need support services. 
(B)  DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTIONS  
In 2014, Tasmania published a report reviewing the adequacy of advocacy 
services available to its children and youth.207 The report suggests that a lack of centrality 
to services causes vagueness for families and professionals on how to access services.208 
In Queensland, Australia, under the Child Protection Act,209 several mechanisms are in 
place to promote children’s voice in child protection hearings: 
[C]hildren can be represented by a 'separate representative' in child protection 
matters. A separate representative is a lawyer who must act in the child's best 
interests, regardless of any instructions from the child, but also must, as far as 
possible, present the child's views and wishes to the court or tribunal. A child who 
is sufficiently mature may also be represented by a 'direct representative'. A direct 
representative acts under instructions from the child, and supports the child to 
express his or her views and give evidence.210  																																																								
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The Queensland legislation is discretionary in that children ‘can’ be represented as 
opposed to stating that children ‘shall’ or ‘must’ be represented. One criticism of the 
Australian system is the lack of access to counsel. For instance, Walsh and Douglas 
suggested that the lack of access to counsel is not necessarily a result of a lack of 
resources available to children and families, but rather that children and parents of 
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds are unaware of free legal services available 
to them.211 Similarly, Saskatchewan is faced with the issue of parents entering into what 
is termed a Section 9 Agreement under the CFSA212 without the advisement of counsel.  
These agreements are intended to be voluntary wherein a parent voluntarily permits the 
MSS to place the child in Ministry care pending further determination.  The ‘voluntary’ 
aspect of the agreement is highly contentions as parents approached to enter into these 
agreements by the MSS without the presence of counsel or a representative may be 
unduly pressured and lack a full understating of the Agreement’s implications. Without 
counsel, parents in both the Australian and Canadian context may “unknowingly 
compromise their chances of preventing the removal of their children by making 
admissions or consenting to interviews without legal advice or assistance”213. 
Many jurisdictions have taken the position that individual liberty rights protected 
in state constitutions extend to the protection of children in relation to Article 12.214 The 
difficulty with this proposition is that assuming children’s individual rights are protected 
under state constitutions fails to recognize that children have significant barriers in 																																																																																																																																																																					
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accessing legal systems. This is exacerbated in the context of child welfare, as children 
subject to child welfare proceedings are frequently the most disadvantaged children in a 
particular state.215  The presumption by state bodies that constitutional protections 
afforded to adults will extend on an equal playing field to children ignores the 
vulnerabilities of children and assumes that children’s protective rights are more 
legitimate than their participatory rights and right to the appointment of counsel.216 As 
such, state parties have “been quite slow to expressly list the rights of the child, including 
the right to be heard at a constitutional level, despite the fact that it is something which is 
encouraged.”217 The Australian National Children’s Commissioner commented on the 
status of the CRC as it relates to children’s access to justice, stating that, “twenty years 
after we ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, vulnerable groups of children 
and young people in this country continue to lack adequate human rights protections.”218 
However, the report on Tasmania shows that the CRC does not place children’s rights in 
diametric opposition to parents’ rights.219 The study indicates that children’s rights are 
properly placed with in the framework of parental rights and responsibilities, relying on 
statements in the CRC that recognize the family environment as being the best place for 
children to be nurtured and to grow.220   
An additional aspect to the legislative frameworks in some jurisdictions is the use 																																																								
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of Independent Human Rights Institutes for Children (IHRIC). The Tasmania report 
questions the effectiveness of IHRIC,221 stating that the effectiveness of an IHRIC relies 
upon its independence, financial autonomy, accountability mechanisms, and child 
participation. IHRICs alone cannot produce favourable outcomes for children that ensure 
their rights are protected. Therefore, Tasmania has suggested that IHRICs and the 
National Commissioner must work alongside other forms of government to improve the 
status of children’s rights.222 Unlike the Canadian framework where independent children 
commissioners exist only at a provincial level, Australia and Tasmania use a national 
children’s commissioner. It has been suggested that “[i]n the approximately 40 countries 
that have appointed children’s commissioners or ombudspersons, such appointees have 
been able to act as links between children’s grassroots activism and more formal political 
representation such as Cabinet Ministers for Children and parliamentary committees.”223 
However, multi-agency oversight into child welfare processes and governance is 
strikingly problematic because it involves a piecemeal framework wherein independent 
agencies attempt to fulfill CRC obligations. Any piecemeal framework runs the risk of 
lack of coordination for ensuring children’s ‘voice,’ such as with the discretionary 
approach to access representation for children. 
One way to help ensure that children’s voices are heard may be the use of 
guardians ad litem (GAL) in the child welfare context: “'[C]hild guardians' often work in 
tandem with lawyers to provide holistic representation of children. In some 
circumstances, the guardian will instruct the lawyer; in other situations, the guardian will 
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assist the child to put forward their views and wishes to the court.” 224 Several countries, 
such as Germany, Ireland, England, and the United States, use GALs, but no standard 
exists in regards to their role or training. In Germany, the inclusion of the GAL was 
intended to guarantee “that the independent interests of the child are incorporated into the 
procedure so that the child does not become a mere object of the proceeding.”225 The 
Irish system requires an appointment of a GAL, but does not specify the GAL’s role. The 
English system requires the GAL to operate independently and to put forward the child’s 
best interest.226 In the United States’ system, “many child guardians are lawyers with 
specialist training in child welfare.” 227 
Australia does use GALs—“generally laypeople, often a family member or social 
worker, who act as a support person during court proceedings”228—but they remain an 
infrequently accessed resource. Because the courts exercise discretion in appointing 
representatives for children, and the representative’s role is to present the best interests of 
the child and not necessarily the child’s expressed interest,229 GALs may help to protect 
the child’s expressed interest. A benefit to the increased use of a GAL can be specifically 
related to Indigenous children: 
[I]n all cases involving indigenous children, an indigenous guardian ad litem 
should be appointed to the child even if the child has legal representation, because 
the very visible sight of a non-Indigenous independent legal representative 
performing such a pivotal role can only serve to reinforce the negative perceptions 
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Indigenous people have of the Children's Court process.230 
 
In Australia, the use of a GAL may be beneficial in protecting the ‘voice’ of the child in a 
situation where the child gives a direct representative direction that conflicts with what 
the direct representatives believes to be in the child’s best interest.231  In Canada the use 
of an Indigenous GAL could potentially alleviate the imbalance of Indigenous ‘voice’ 
with respect to the representation available for Indigenous children.  
In the United Sates many children in child protection hearings are granted a 
representative to communicate the child’s opinion. Guggenheim suggests that 
professional involvement in legal proceedings does not necessarily result in positive 
outcomes for children or their parents: “the lives of both the adults and children are 
advanced by limiting the situations in which either’s fate is to be determined by state 
officials.”232 Guggenheim’s critique raises the question of whether affording children 
voice by way of a third party child advocate in child protection hearings actually furthers 
children’s rights or acts in the child’s best interest.  
The United States lacks consistent legislation, a central body, or consistent 
mechanism by which children and child advocates access representation for children in 
child protection proceedings. The United Satates refused to ratify the CRC, largely 
because of the perceived potential for children’s rights to trump parental rights to 
authority.233  Several reasons why children’s rights have not been given the same 
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attention they have in European counties, which has contributed to a lack of consistency 
in children’s access to representation, have been suggested by critics: “(1) the lack of an 
express grant of positive rights for children in the Constitution; (2) the failure of the 
United States to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (3) 
difficulty in defining what is included within the term “rights”; (4) the perceived 
incapacity of some children to exercise their rights: and (5) the fear that children’s rights 
will come at the expense of parental rights, thus extending government power over 
families.”234 Thus, similar to the situation in both Canada and Australia, children in the 
United States rely on a piecemeal approach to advocacy and access to services based on 
both federal and state legislation.  
 Although the American Bar Association (ABA) has begun to address the role of 
lawyers in child protection proceedings, lawyers primarily adopt the best interest 
approach.235  Many question when a child’s voice should be added to the debate.236  Elrod 
argues that children’s voices should be added “whenever the child's interests and the 
parent's interests are not aligned, or the same.”237 However, this interpretation does not 
address situations where the state’s interest does not align with the parents’ or where the 
child’s interests do align with the parents’ and not the state’s. In both situations the 
child’s interests may still require adequate voice and recognition in the process.  
Participation cannot simply be limited to situations where the child’s interests do not 
align with the parents’. However, unlike mandatory jurisdictions such as Norway, 
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Sweden, Germany and Finland, discretionary jurisdictions rarely have legislation placing 
a legal obligation on the state to ensure that the child is heard in determining the best 
interest of the child.238 
 In summary, representation must be made available in all proceedings involving a 
child (ideally in all matters involving children in both the private law setting and child 
welfare setting). Additionally, representation can not be limited to situations where a 
child welfare worker, judge or opposing counsel perceives a need for counsel and makes 
a request for counsel.  Nor is it up to children to make a request for counsel, as 
presumably most children are unaware of their rights and the right to participation as 
identified by the CRC. The discretionary status of the CRC’s implementation at both the 
provincial and federal level results in Indigenous children subject to the child welfare 
system being disadvantaged at a disproportionate rate to non-Indigenous children.  
Indigenous children are disadvantaged in two ways. First by the inadequate access of 
counsel to FNCFSA because of unawareness of the program. And secondly by real and 
perceived concern of FNCFSA and Indigenous peoples about the role of non-Indigenous 
counsel acting for an Indigenous child and what biases counsel may have during the 
course of their representation.  Therefore, CRC implementation can not be limited to 
western concepts of children’s ‘voice’, the use of only lawyers as child representatives, or 
the discretionary appointment of lawyers to meet Canada’s commitment to the 
implementation of the CRC and UNDRIP.  
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CHAPTER 5: ‘BEST INTEREST’ IN CHILD WELFARE CASES IN SASKATCHEWAN 
 This chapter sets out to examine the concept of ‘best interests’ 239 of the child in 
child welfare cases, and how best interests is perceived in relation to Indigenous children. 
The best interests principle remains the framework in the Canadian context with regard to 
addressing issues related to children in both the domestic family law context and the child 
welfare context. In Saskatchewan, section 4 of the CFSA240 articulates the best interest 
test with respect to child apprehensions. Although the CFSA considers the “cultural” and 
“spiritual” needs of a child, a reliance on the best interests principle may be problematic. 
As Appell and Boyer note, 
[the] standard is exceptionally vulnerable to arbitrary decision-making. The lack of a 
uniform understanding of the term "best interests", coupled with the uncertainty 
inherent in its use, raises significant concerns about "social engineering." 
Furthermore, such ambiguity will have the greatest impact on the least visible and 
respected population of families whose racial and economic status already places 
them at great risk of destructive state intervention. Most importantly, a threshold 
intervention standard purportedly based on the child's interest does not protect 
children from decisions based on the conflicting interests of unrelated adults; rather, it 
simply serves in practice to shift responsibility for making decisions about children 																																																								
239 The “best Interest” principle is relied upon by Canadian courts in deciding matters relating to 
children in both child welfare and domestic family matters. It is further identified as a primary 
consideration in the CRC.  
240 Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11. s. 4. Which reads as follows:  
Where a person or court is required by any provision of this Act other than subsection 49(2) to 
determine the best interests of a child, the person or court shall take into account: 
(a) the quality of the relationships that the child has with any person who may 
have a close connection with the child; 
(b) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development; 
(c) the child’s emotional, cultural, physical, psychological and spiritual needs; 
(d) the home environment proposed to be provided for the child; 
(e) the plans for the care of the child of the person to whom it is proposed that the 
custody of the child be entrusted; 
(f) where practicable, the child’s wishes, having regard to the age and level of the 
child’s development; 
(g) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the 
child of disruption of that continuity; and 
(h) the effect on the child of a delay in making a decision. [emphasis added] 
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among adults.241 
 
Appell and Boyer argue that the test for state intervention should be lowered to a standard 
of “parental unfitness or parental unwillingness.”242 Although best interest is problematic, 
reducing the standard to “parental unwillingness” will not further children’s rights.  
In determining best interest in relation to Indigenous children, the courts have prioritized 
individual rights over communal rights, which often fail to protect Indigenous groups’ 
collective rights, and as such have failed to protect Indigenous children. This is not to 
suggest that there are not situations where individual rights may be in conflict to such a 
severe degree that communal rights are appropriately seen as less important.  However; 
the jurisprudence and opinion of those working in the child welfare arena is that too often 
an insufficient assessment of the importance of a child’s communal rights and interests is 
undertaken by the judicial system. Interviewees describe the Saskatchewan experience of 
‘best interest’ in relation to child welfare cases as prioritizing an individual approach to 
understanding rights, which does not support Indigenous communities, children or 
concepts of communal rights: 
In all the cases that I have read that notion [of best interest of the child] is so 
manipulated…the best interest of the child is a really great way to package the 
“best argument”. Generally the judge will side with the non-Indigenous party as 
representing the best interest of the child.243 Raven Sinclaire  
 
Typically the CRC is understood from the perspective of the individual child’s 
rights. For example, Article 12.1 relates to a child’s individual right to articulate their 
opinion with respect to matters involving them. However, an understanding of what “best 																																																								
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interest” means in the context of Indigenous cultural child-rearing practices would result 
in better outcomes for Indigenous children. As one FNCFSA Director articulated, 
When we look at what is in the best interest of the child. You can’t just say, what 
is in the best interest of this child only, you have to look at the context of their 
family their extended family and their community.  In looking at this whole 
advocacy thing - children advocates then look at what they believe is in the best 
interest of that child, based on their understanding of the world.244 Director of 
FNCFSA 
 
Article 30 of the CRC does address Indigenous children’s rights to some extent, but these 
rights are based on an individual rights approach.245 Focusing solely on individual rights 
ignores the reality of Indigenous children’s lives because, as Indigenous groups argue, 
individual and collective rights are powerfully interconnected:246 Article 30 of the CRC 
supports the notion that Indigenous children should not be denied their right in 
community or to culture.  If the best interests analysis does not take into account 
communal interests and rights of Indigenous children, then the Articles of the CRC and 
UNDRIP are not being met: 
Indigenous children will not enjoy the full benefit of their rights unless they are 
living within healthy, strong communities that enjoy full rights to self-
determination, to enjoy their traditional land and resources, and to maintain their 
unique culture and society. For these reasons, the UNCRC must be interpreted in 
such a way as to account for the reality of community experienced by Indigenous 
children.247 
 
The suggestion that the CRC “must be interpreted in such a way as to account for the 
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reality of community experienced by Indigenous children” most accurately represents the 
best interest principle as it relates to the child’s ‘voice.’   
If it is assumed that the best interests of a child are connected to the protection of 
their communal rights, then the best interest principle can be used as a framework for 
supporting and protecting both individual and communal rights. With respect to 
Indigenous children and the current overrepresentation of those children in the child 
welfare context, which too frequently includes the removal of Indigenous children from 
their communities, children’s rights urgently need to become addressed not only in the 
individual context but also in the community context.  As the First Nations Child and 
Family Caring Society (FNCFCS) identifies, often the only mechanism of protecting 
Indigenous culture is through the children of that particular group.248   
That is the problem with un-interrogated racism is that there is this hegemonic 
way of being in the world and everyone else has to sort of conform to that, and it 
is not challenged or questioned at all. 
… 
 This is where the cultural bias come in, this un-interrogated assumption that the 
non-indigenous family is going to be able to provide a wonderful environment for 
an [Indigenous] child.  It just goes without questioning, yet what we know from 
the literature is that attachment and bonding can be disrupted from a chaotic 
environment. I would argue that an Indigenous child being placed in a non-
indigenous environment is inherently a chaotic environment. And people [foster 
parents] are not trained to deal with that. My own dad said, “we love you, but we 
had no business adopting you” as well intentioned as they were they had no idea 
how to raise an Indigenous child or what it meant to be Indigenous.249 Raven 
Sinclaire 
 
Removal of children from Indigenous community and culture necessarily results 
in a form of cultural genocide similar to that of the residential schools era.  
Understanding Indigenous children’s rights as both communal and individual rights 
creates a framework for protecting indigeneity:  																																																								
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[I]n many Indigenous cultures extended family members and the community play 
an important and direct role in a child’s upbringing, in addition to biological 
parents. To Western eyes, this has sometimes created the impression of parental 
neglect and has contributed to high rates of child removals by child welfare 
authorities in Australia, Canada, the United States and other places.250 
 
Removing Indigenous children from their communities and families has considerable 
detrimental impacts; therefore, the western framework of prioritizing individual rights 
over Indigenous children’s future rights to culture can result in a loss of identity that is 
unique for Indigenous children because of Canada’s colonial history as it relates to 
residential schools and the Sixties Scoop and the assimilation of Indigenous children:  
The results of such policies for Indigenous children, and particularly during the 
adolescent stage, often involve drastic negative effects on all aspects of health and 
well being. One Canadian researcher interviewed a number of First Nations adults 
who had been adopted as children into non-Aboriginal homes. “The major loss 
identified by the adoptees,” wrote Carriere, “was identity.” The loss of family 
origins, relationships, and First Nations culture contributed to a number of poor 
health outcomes, such as substance abuse, suicidal tendencies, anxiety, eating 
disorders, depression, running away, and particularly feeling unwanted, confused, 
“like an outsider”, and “wanting to belong”. 251 [Emphasis added]. 
 
Edgar notes that “[t]he western world has decided that a rights-based liberal democracy is 
the system most suited to provide and protect these moral rights.”252 Part of realizing 
individual rights with respect to Indigenous children in child welfare cases involves 
realizing that those individual rights include collective rights. Newman suggests that 
individual rights can be harmonized with communal rights.253 In discussing Indigenous 
child adoptions under the American Indian and Child Welfare Act,254 Newman states the 
following:  																																																								
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[T]here may be very good moral reasons for an adoption policy with goals that 
include cultural flourishing, fully consistent with a moral account of an interaction 
of individual and collective rights without a direct conflict of rights. That said, if 
some community, counterfactually, were genuinely insensitive to the interests of 
children and put them knowingly for adoption in families where they suffered 
abuses (actions deliberately directed against the interests of the children, as 
compared to those with some limited negative effects on the interests of the 
children), there would be reason for any political community, with the power to 
do so, to interfere with this violation…255 
 
 Although the rights and principles of the CRC have been ratified by Canada, the 
failure to incorporate specific child rights into the Canadian legal system has caused a 
delay and imbalance in the access to justice for Indigenous children. A western-focused 
framework of individual rights has further damaged the best interest of the Indigenous 
child in child protection proceedings and ignored the possibility of collective rights and 
individual rights supporting each other to determine the child’s best interest.  As Cooney 
identified in interview:  
It is a very difficult role to advocate, because you want to fix things and you 
predetermine…a legal test for best interest is very difficult, because there are so 
many variables, ages, background, and mental capacity. 
… 
 What is problematic is that the judge knows nothing about child welfare or the 
family 
… 
It’s too easy for a lawyer advocating for a child to say, “you are right, they 
should stay in that foster home because the each get their own room, and they are 
well cared for”. Glenda Cooney  
 
While best interests is intended to be context specific and unique to the individual child, 
recent decisions in the Canadian context continue to be fraught with western concepts of 
best interest despite provincial legislative frameworks that identify communal and 
cultural factors as significant to the best interest analysis.256 Algonquins of Pikwakanagan 																																																								
255 Supra note 246 at 287. 
256 Problematic with finding evidence of cultural bias with respect to the determination of “best 
interest” in child welfare cases, is that by enlarge most decisions remain unreported. Therefore, 
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v. Children's Aid Society of the County of Renfrew257 involved two Indigenous sisters 
who had been placed in non-Indigenous foster care families. Their biological 
grandmother and the respective First Nation appealed a decision of the Ontario Superior 
court granting a long-term order that the children remain in the care of the foster parents. 
The biological grandmother previously had the children in her care, but continually 
struggled with alcohol use. Because of the grandmother’s struggle, the children were 
removed from her care and placed in foster care where they had consistently resided for 
approximately four years at the time of the appeal. The judicial history of the case is as 
follows:  
1.  The first trial and appeal: The matter proceeded to trial in the fall of 2011.  
On the first day of trial, a representative of the Algonquins of Pikwakanagan 
attended and asked for a brief adjournment to review disclosure that had only 
been provided that day, and to consult with counsel.  The trial judge refused the 
adjournment, proceeded with the trial and ordered that the girls were to be Crown 
wards without access for the purposes of adoption.  The children were placed with 
Mr. and Mrs. D.  On appeal, a new trial was ordered on the basis that the trial 
judge should have granted the adjournment and that the trial judge failed to give 
“due weight and consideration” to the children’s First Nations status.258 
3.  The second trial: A retrial commenced on July 30, 2012.  By this time, 
M.B.[grandmother] had access visits with the girls.  Mr. and Mrs. D. 
accommodated the access in an effort to keep the children connected to their 
Aboriginal heritage.  The Society amended its application to pursue Crown 
wardship with access to M.B.259 
 
The court engaged in weighing what are often identified as competing interests in 
determining the outcome for the children: specifically, the importance of attachment and 
continuity of care was weighed against evidence of cultural identity.  Chief Kirby 
Whiteduck of the Algonquins of Pikwakanagan Nation testified that the removal of 																																																																																																																																																																					
the availability for outside scrutiny of the case law and the analysis as it relates to concepts of 
“best interest” is limited to the few decision that are reported or appealed. 
257 Algonquins of Pikwakanagan v. Children's Aid Society of the County of Renfrew 2014 ONCA 
646 
258 Supra note 257 at 18. 
259 Ibid at para 22. 
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Aboriginal children from their communities leads to alcoholism, violence, suicide, anger 
and resentment”260 and that the court “must look not only at the best interests of the child, 
but also at the best interests of the adult that the child will become.”261 Further, evidence 
was presented “about the damage caused to Aboriginal people in the 1960s and 
continuing to the 2000s, when children were removed from their families by child 
welfare authorities and placed in mostly non-Aboriginal homes. The children were lost 
on a personal and on a community level and often became homeless.”262 With respect to 
Indigenous children, the Ontario Child and Family Services Act263 (CFSA) was 
summarized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Algonquin as follows:  
Subsection 57(5) provides that, “unless there is a substantial reason for placing 
the child elsewhere”, Aboriginal children shall be placed with a member of the 
child’s extended family, a member of the child’s “band or native community”, or 
“another Indian or native family.”264 
Subsection 37(3) of the CFSA lists the factors that must be considered in 
assessing the best interests of a child.  When a child is from an Aboriginal 
community, the CFSA further directs in s. 37(4) that the importance of the child’s 
cultural identity and the uniqueness of Aboriginal culture, heritage and traditions 
shall be taken into account.  There is nothing in the CFSA that suggests that the 
“weight” given to one consideration must be greater than the weight given to 
another.  All factors are considered with the over-arching goal of determining the 
best interests of the child.  This is consistent with the paramount purpose of the 
Act and every section must be read in this context.265[Emphasis added]. 
Similarly, s. 57(5) requires the court to place an Aboriginal child with a member 
of the child’s extended family, a member of the child’s band or native community 
or another “Indian family”, unless there is a substantial reason not to.  Given the 
CFSA’s paramount purpose, s. 57(5) cannot be read as usurping the best interests 
of the child.266 
 
Similar to past decisions with respect to Indigenous children, the Ontario Court of 
																																																								
260 Ibid at para 29. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Supra note 257 at para 28. 
263 Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 
264 Supra note 257 at para 59. 
265 Ibid at para 67. 
266 Ibid at para 68. 
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Appeal (ONCA) agreed with the trial court ruling and focused on what it describes to be 
the paramount importance of the Act, being the best interest of the child. In the language 
of section 57(5) of the Ontario CFSA, there is a presumptive requirement that an 
Indigenous child be placed with “a member of the child’s extended family, a member of 
the child’s band or native community or another “Indian family,”” which is limited by 
the language, “unless there is a substantial reason not to.” The ONCA decision followed 
the historical jurisprudential framework in Canada that focuses on the best interest from 
the perspective of the individual child. Ultimately the ONCA raised concern with respect 
to best interest of the child as something that could be analyzed within a community and 
cultural framework:   
The Act makes clear the Legislature’s intention that First Nations’ issues be 
seriously considered. However, all considerations, including First Nations’ issues, 
are subject to the ultimate issue: what is in the best interests of the child?  Nothing 
displaces the best interests of the child and no section of the Act overrides the 
child’s best interests. [Emphasis added].267 
 
There are circumstances wherein there is a valid reason not to remove a child from their 
placement in a long-term foster home, or where there may be other limiting reasons for 
not following the presumptive requirement to place the child in culturally appropriate 
care; however, Canadian courts use the “unless there is reason not to” language of the 
legislation to support western concepts of best interest to the detriment of the Indigenous 
child’s actual best interests.  
In a recent Manitoba decision, West Region CFS v. L.A.H. et al. and M.H. et 
al.,268 a guardianship application was brought concerning a 6-year-old Indigenous child 
who had been residing with her foster parents for a period of 6 years (since infancy). The 																																																								
267 Supra note 257 at para 71. 
268 West Region CFS v. L.A.H. et al. and M.H. et al 2016 MBQB 48.  
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Manitoba West Region Child and Family Services Agency argued that it had found more 
culturally appropriate care for the child where her two siblings resided. Ultimately, in a 
similar finding to the ONCA decision, the court held that the child should remain with 
her foster parents on a continued basis as the foster home was the only home that the 
child had known: 
After having considered all aspects of best interest criteria in s. 2(1) of the Act, 
including primary consideration of H.H.’s security and safety and all other 
relevant matters to be considered under s. 2(1), I find overwhelmingly on the 
balance of probabilities that H.H.’s best interests require that she remain with the 
only people she has known as her mother and father and accordingly M.H. and 
D.H.’s guardianship application request is granted.269 
 
This particular case included additional factors with respect to the proposed placement 
that reasonably made the court wary of removing the child from her foster home.270  
However, while the order in the case that places the children in their foster home 
permanently appears appropriate in terms of continuity of care for the child and the fact 
that the child was bonded to the foster family, the issue of cultural identity is yet again 
given minimal weight by the court’s analysis of attachment and  stability and arguably 
the court’s reluctance to disturb the status quo in an effort to maintain attachment with 
the foster family. While foster parents often care for children for extended periods of 
time, that is not the intention of the foster parent relationship.  The 6-year placement in 
the aforementioned decision raises serious questions with respect to the role of the foster 
parent relationship, which is ultimately intended to be temporary. To prevent the blurring 
of a foster parent relationship into a parental relationship, Sinclair suggests reform with 
respect to the role of foster parents: 
																																																								
269 Supra note 268 at para 138. 
270 Supra note 268. 
80	
 
What I want to see across the country is a legal document that foster parents have 
to sign that the ideology of foster parents, stating that they will not pursue an 
adoption…Attachment is not a quantifiable construct.  It is an idea, yet they will 
bring in professionals. She [worker/lawyer] says they look happy there, therefore 
they must be attached.  I looked happy in my adopted pictures, but I was a very 
traumatized child.271 Raven Sinclair 
 
In Canada, foster parent placements are intended until a long-term placement is ordered 
or an adoptive family is secured for the child, depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the child’s adoptability. Cooney states that a “[p]ermanent order should not 
mean permanent in the sense that if a viable option arises where the kids can go home 
that they do not.”272 
5.1 ATTACHMENT AND CULTURAL GENOCIDE 
The case law suggests an additional element wherein children are placed in a 
foster care relationship for such an extended period of time that they become entrenched 
in that placement. As a result of extended foster care placements, courts are reluctant to 
disrupt the status quo and may be correct in their assessment that the child has formed an 
attachment to the foster parent, which would render a change in living arrangements risky 
and potentially detrimental to the child’s development. However, long term placements 
contribute to the genocidal effects of Saskatchewan’s child welfare system: 
Workers are now telling people if you want to keep a [Indigenous] child just 
foster them because the Ministry policies will work in your favour.  Because by 
the time it gets to court they will win because of this idea of attachment….. the 
flaw with this precedence is that it is just not true. In my research and the 
research of people that I know, shows that culture is the most important thing. 
And any Indigenous person who is in care in any form will re-patriate between 
teen-hood until adult-hood. The irony in that case [Racina Woods]273 is that 																																																								
271 Supra note 11. 
272 Supra note 163. 
273 For a full description of the racial elements in Racine v. Woods SEE: Wesley Crichlow, 
“Western Colonization as Disease: Native Adoption & Cultural Genocide”, Critical Social work. 
2002 Volume 3  No. 1. 
Another case illustrates the minimization of culture in an even more racist fashion and 
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within the year after they won this court case they[adoptive parents] returned her 
to care, it is appalling. If you are that attached and bonded to a child, you would 
never return them to care the way you would like a little puppy, returning them to 
the pound because the ideology of western adoption is that it is as if they [the 
child] is born to you, and yet somehow Indigenous children are more 
disposable.”274 [Emphasis added] Raven Sinclair 
 
One FNCFSA Director stated that his agency came across this scheme a while back and 
now takes the policy approach that if a child is apprehended at birth or in infancy, the 
FNCFSA ensures that one of its workers is available to provide culturally appropriate 
care to the infant child. The FNCFSA found that infant placements were being used as a 
way for non-Indigenous families to adopt Indigenous babies:  
The Ministry has apprehended babies right after birth, and so what happens is 
that they go to a foster home.  They actually have people lined up, they have a list 
of people looking for babies, so then the baby goes there.  By the time that we find 
out there is already an application to court, and so we don’t know what is going 
on so we oppose it. Next thing you know the Advocate is contacting us saying that 
the baby has been with this [foster] family for this long and we strongly urge that 
they need to stay with them so you need to back off, and we are like “no”.” 
… 
We actually came across this scam some time back and we were wondering what 
was going on, it is like a little baby farm scam and scheme going on.  So how we 
have responded to this is that if a child is apprehended at birth, we go there 
immediately and assume care for that child or infant, and then we look for 
extended family from there, right from the very beginning. And we actually had to 																																																																																																																																																																					
has been highly criticized by First Nation communities and child advocate activists. In 
Racine v. Woods, [1983] 1 D.L.R. (4 th ) 193 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Racine], the Supreme 
Court of Canada granted an adoption order of an Indian child to Métis foster parents. The 
child had been under the care of the foster parents since the age of six weeks with the 
mother’s consent. At the age of two, the child was returned briefly to the natural mother, 
after which time the foster parents reclaimed the child and denied contact the natural 
parent, in this case the mother. At the time of the Supreme Court decision, the child was 
eight years old. Madame Justice Wilson made the following statements in reference to 
evaluating the best interests of the child test of an Indian child: 
...when the test to be met is the best interests of the child, the significance of 
cultural background and heritage as opposed to bonding abates over time. The 
closer the bond that develops with the prospective adoptive parents, the less 
important the racial element becomes. (Racine 187). 
 
274 Supra note 11. 
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confront the Ministry on this practice in order for them to back down from it….It 
was strange that friends of workers were getting babies.275 Director FNCFSA. 
 
However, the economic disadvantage of FNCFSA (because of the reliance on federal 
funding) means that they cannot forcefully address genocidal Ministry policies: “part of 
it is that you have agencies that are not strong enough to stand up to the Ministry and say 
“no”, so the practice is allowed to continue.”276  
The concern with disrupting the attachment a child has formed with his or her 
foster parents has not been the focus of the United States case law.  Under the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), attachment is not the primary focus of the legislation. As a 
result, in the United States the presumption in favour of culturally appropriate care has 
been followed more aggressively than in Canada. Further, in the United States there is 
less reliance on the “unless there is reason not to” language, regardless of the attachment 
impact that it could have on the child.277  
As previously identified, the Canadian Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H.278 
decision has taken a profoundly different view on the best interest of the Indigenous child 
by focusing not solely on the child’s individual rights but their communal rights.279  It is 
notable that the judge in the Hamilton Health Science decision is himself First Nations.  
The judge’s understanding of the importance of community and culture may have 
informed his decision in concluding that maintaining the right to engage in cultural 
healing was a way of protecting the best interest of the child. This case marks an 
exception to the typical jurisprudential understanding of best interest in Canada, which is 																																																								
275 Supra note 54. 
276 Supra note 54. 
277 SEE Re Alexandria P. 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (Ct. App. 2014). 
278 Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H., 2014 ONCJ 603A. 
279 Ibid. 
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frequently framed by courts in Charter section 7 arguments, supporting the protection of 
the child’s individual rights.  
 The focus on individual rights as being in the Indigenous child’s best interest 
inherently ignores the communal interest of Indigenous communities and has resulted in 
western concepts of the child’s best interest being entrenched in court systems in Canada.  
This is not to suggest that there are not circumstances where the child’s right to security 
and safety should not be considered paramount based on the factual circumstances, nor 
situations where it may be appropriate for a child to remain or be placed in non-
Indigenous child care or foster care.  However, what has remained problematic in the 
Canadian context is that communal rights and cultural rights have been seen as a lesser 
interest to be considered by courts in child welfare cases. Cultural rights should not 
always trump attachment issues. However, they should be assessed to the same extent 
that the child’s individual rights are accessed.  
By comparison, application of the ICWA likely would have resulted in different 
outcomes in many Canadian decisions, as the ICWA supports tribes’ veto rights.  
Interested parties and foster parents in the United States have challenged tribal veto 
rights. For example, the Goldwater Institute argues that, while the 1978 ICWA laws were 
well intentioned, they have resulted in the unequal treatment of Indigenous children by 
giving preference of adoption to Indian families.280  This argument raises the question of 
whether preserving Indian culture, community and language should validly trump socio-
economic status, security and availability of adoption or long-term placement.  																																																								
280 Goldwater Institute, “Goldwater Institute Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Parts of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act” (July 7 2015) Online < 
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/constitutional-rights/equal-protection/goldwater-
institute-files-class-action-lawsuit-aga/>  
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Additionally, the Goldwater Institute has argued in its case against the ICWA that 
Indigenous children are more likely to remain in abusive homes.  However, their 
argument has neglected to consider that the high incidences of Indigenous child removals 
in the United States has been the result of prejudice towards Indigenous child rearing and 
families’ socio-economic status and not directly related to child abuse.281  
More commonly, and to the detriment of Indigenous culture, the Canadian 
perspective interprets “best interest” based on western concepts of child rearing and the 
individual child rights.  The United States, through the use of the ICWA, has taken a 
broader approach to understanding the best interest in the framework of communal rights, 
even though it is not a signatory to the CRC.  The ICWA has been used by courts to 
consider the future rights of the Indigenous child while considering the preservation of 
cultural identity. While some have criticized the legislative framework under the ICWA 
as failing to adequately consider the best interest of the individual child, the best interest 
test is actually more properly framed within a communal rights framework wherein the 
best interest of the individual child is related to an understanding of the best interest of 
child in relation to their community.  
Provinces continue to exercise jurisdiction over child welfare on reserve through 
section 88 of the Indian Act. Indigenous communities in Canada may benefit from federal 
legislation similar to the ICWA that promotes Indigenous self-governance over child 
welfare, and a presumption in favour of placement within the child’s community.  
																																																								
281 SEE supra note 246. 
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CHAPTER 6: LAWYER ADVOCACY IN SASKATCHEWAN CHILD WELFARE CASES: THE ROLE 
OF COUNSEL, CFC PROGRAM AND THE SASKATCHEWAN CHILDREN’S ADVOCATE 
The role of the lawyer for the child is no different from the role of the lawyer for 
any other party; he or she is there to represent the client by protecting the client’s 
interests and carrying out the client’s instructions. At the same time, the lawyer is 
an officer of the Court and as such is obliged to represent these interests in 
accordance with well-defined standards of professional integrity.282  
 
Despite Madam Justice Abella’s, as she then was, recommendation that the 
instructional role of lawyering be adopted in a lawyer-child-client relationship, it is often 
not adopted in Canada, and even when it is, it often falls victim to the advocate’s personal 
bias.  This chapter examines advocacy models and programs available in Saskatchewan 
and identifies limitations and concerns with programs offering advocacy to children. 
Specifically, this chapter raises concerns with respect to Indigenous children’s access to 
both procedural and substantive justice through current child representational models 
used in Saskatchewan, The current advocacy model employed in Saskatchewan does not 
provide Indigenous children with voice.283 In addition, there are significant concerns 
regarding outside counsel representing children on First Nations in child welfare matters, 
particularly because not all lawyers are adequately trained to address Indigenous issues.  
This failure perpetuates a lack of Indigenous children's voice as mandated for by the 
CRC.  Provincial programs identified below, which aim to provide advocacy for children, 
are especially inaccessible to communities in northern parts of the province. Presently 
there are only 11 lawyers trained to act as counsel for children on child welfare cases in 
																																																								
282 Re W. (1980) 27 O.R. (2d) 314, at 5 (Prov. Ct.) at para 29. 
283 Supra note 79.  
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the province. These lawyers also practice on a range of other legal files and do not solely 
practice in the area of child advocacy.284 
6.1 SASKATCHEWAN COUNSEL PROGRAM (CFC) 
The presumptive use of lawyers appointed to act for children in the child welfare 
context raises issues with respect to what role that lawyer takes. This is particularly a 
concern when a lawyer advocates for an Indigenous child. As Sheri Woods identifies, “I 
just don’t know how anyone could just walk onto a reserve, and meet with a kid and 
adequately represent their wishes in a courtroom.”285  
When looking at what role a lawyer has in child welfare cases involving 
Indigenous children, FNCFSA have expressed a lack of acceptance of provincial 
programs in place.286 In Saskatchewan, as part of an effort to move away from an ad hoc 
system of appointment of counsel, the Counsel for Children and Youth Program (CFC) 
was created. As the program’s Director describes, the program was developed from a 
2008 report issued by the Ministry of Justice on access to justice for children and youth, 
which indicated a need for counsel for children.287 Prior to the current program, a pro 
bono program was in place in Saskatchewan involving the Children’s Advocate and the 
Law Society of Saskatchewan. Following the 2008 report, an inter-agency committee was 
formed involving the Law Society, Ministry of Social Services and Ministry of Justice, 
which was co-chaired by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Social Services, with 
a goal of implementing some of the report’s recommendations.288 The stakeholders 
involved in the discussions included Legal Aid, the Law Society, the Children’s 																																																								
284 Supra note 8. 
285 Supra note 79. 
286 Supra note 28. 
287 Supra note 152. 
288 Supra note 152. 
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Advocate and the Ministry of Social Services.289 As Pottruff states, “we designed the 
Saskatchewan approach, which is the instructional advocacy approach.”290 This 
approach was borrowed heavily from the Alberta model. The program was then launched 
in 2014/2015 and is currently housed in government because the committee believed that 
housing the program with Legal Aid—which often represents parents in child welfare 
cases—would be an inherent conflict of interest.291  
However, as Sheri Woods describes, housing the program in the government is 
also a conflict of interest:  
There was zero consultation, and I am pretty critical of the program but I like the 
work, so right now I just do my files and represent my kids and try to disassociate 
from the program. When I started this work there was no program, so I made an 
application to be court appointed through court services and that was granted 
and that became the way we were doing it…. It was very ad hoc, very sporadic 
and mostly Saskatoon and Regina…. Then that became a bit of a budget issue for 
court services because they were not opposing any of those applications but that 
is not really what they [court services] is there for either. They knew enough not 
to oppose because of the Convention, that says that this is a right that kids have. 
So then the government created the program. And there wasn’t any consultation. 
There was not even consultation with lawyers who were doing the work.292 
She [Director] is not independent; she, in here words, “still wears some hats at 
civil justice and sits on committees”.293  
 
Adding to the conflict is how lawyers advocating on MSS files get paid:  
There was no extra money put at it [the CFC program]. The number that is 
attached to the program is exactly Betty Ann’s salary…..so all they did was take 
Betty Ann’s salary out of civil justice and physically moved her office. Then when 
we submit our bills on these files, she approves them under the program and then 
sends them to the MSS, and the child care workers who are responsible for these 
kids and then we get paid out of the child care budget of the MSS, which is 
another huge conflict, because the front line workers see our accounts, and know 
how much we are getting paid…294 																																																								
289 Ibid. 
290 Supra note 152. 
291 Ibid 
292 Supra note 79. 
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The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and not the MSS pay for counsel’s fees on files 
involving a FNCFSA child. The PGT then collects its bill from INAC.295  Woods 
describes the difficulties in getting paid in a timely manner contributing to additional 
issues with respect to the lawyers that the program attracts: “it attracts people who want 
to do this work for the right reasons and a bunch of people who don’t have work to do 
otherwise and are just doing legal aid farm out work and see this as another way to get 
tariff work.”296   
The CFC program’s manual describes the scope of the program as follows: 
The Counsel for Children Program provides for the appointment of lawyers for 
children and youth who are in the care of the Minister of Social Services pursuant 
to The Child and Family Services Act (“CFSA”). In situations where a child or 
youth is receiving services under the CFSA, a lawyer may be appointed for the 
child or youth on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of the PGT, or in 
situations where the court has ordered that counsel be appointed. Situations where 
a child has been placed with a Person of Sufficient Interest are within the mandate 
of the program.  Children who reside on reserve are also eligible to have a lawyer 
appointed for them, and to that end, the Children’s Counsel will work with First 
Nations agencies to ensure access to the CFC program. The PGT or delegate may 
appoint a lawyer to act on behalf of a child or youth, if the child or youth is, or 
may be, subject to proceedings such as a dispute resolution process, application, 
or appeal under The Child and Family Services Act. 
 
There are additional limitations to the CFC program. First, the program is limited to cases 
that fall within the CFSA. Specifically, counsel can only be appointed if there is an 
ongoing child abuse investigation. Should the Ministry decide not to pursue a child abuse 
investigation and instead the matter proceeds in the private sphere (as a custody and 
access matter for example) between a PSI and parent or between parents) the child is no 
longer entitled to their CFC lawyer:  
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If there is clearly and ongoing child protection matter than I clearly have the 
ability to appoint counsel, and I am supportive of them participating in the 
custody and access matter to make it fit within my mandate. Often our challenge 
has been that in those situations and other situations we will have an application 
going to court on the child protection matter and the Ministry withdraws its 
application and I have no legislative ability to intervene and keep the matters 
going. 
… 
It has become a real problem because the youth wants something resolved, but the 
Ministry says “nah” you are back with your PSI, or we are going to stop the child 
abuse investigation and we will have it dealt with in the custody and access 
proceeding, and that disentitles the child to their day in court.297 Betty Ann 
Pottruff 
 
Secondly, the program’s development is based on Euro-Canadian philosophies regarding 
child advocacy, even though the majority of children who require and are entitled to CRC 
representation are Indigenous. The program’s development did not include FNCFSA and 
Indigenous voices. Thus, the program has been imposed on FNCFSA with zero 
consultation.  As one FNSFSA Director stated, “We have no connection to the 
program.”298 Shingoose stated that not involving FNSFSA in program’s development was 
“not a good practice” because “you need the community and family” involved in the 
advocacy process.299 He notes that not having them involved is “scary”:  
Children and youth should not have to tell their story many times, they should tell 
it once. That the kind of system that we need - integrated services, and if there is a 
role for legal then they should be there too…300 
 
As a result, the CFC program fails to meet CRC requirements as it fails to provide 
voice in all child welfare cases, and additionally marginalizes Indigenous children by not 
consulting with Indigenous peoples as to what practice would permit the Indigenous child 
to be heard.  As Pottruff described, the majority of requests for counsel come from the 																																																								
297 Supra note 152. 
298 Supra note 54 
299 Supra note 28. 
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MSS with only some coming from FNCFSA,301 suggesting the program fails to meet 
CRC standards by being both inaccessible to Indigenous communities and children as 
well as being created without meaningful consultation with FNCFSA.    
6.2 REPRESENTATIONAL MODELS 
Primarily there are three models of representation in relation to children: (1) the 
amicus lawyer, (2) the best interest lawyer, and (3) the instructional advocate. The amicus 
lawyer’s primary function is to ensure that all relevant evidence is before the court or 
decision-making body.302 As Bala notes,  
There is no expectation of confidentiality between the child and the lawyer; to the 
contrary, the amicus lawyer will be disclosing the child’s views and perspectives 
to the court and the other parties. The lawyer adopting this role might retain a 
social worker or mental health professional to investigate the child’s 
circumstances or assist in interviewing the child and providing evidence about the 
child’s wishes303  
 
The amicus role was adopted by Canadian lawyers in the 1970s and is still the model 
widely used in other jurisdictions.304 The lawyer in this role can be described as being a 
“friend of the court”: they are intended to provide a full picture of the child’s situation to 
the court, without prejudicing that information by including a personal belief as to what 
the outcome should be. In Saskatchewan child welfare cases, the amicus model is used by 
lawyers where the instructional model is not practicable, due to age, mental capacity or 
maturity of the child.305 Lawyers acting for children in Saskatchewan have identified one 
barrier to their ability to act for children in that the MSS does not provide full disclosure 
to CFC lawyer in all cases. It has been suggested by CFC lawyers that the Ministry 																																																								
301 Supra note 152.  
302 Supra note 49 at 683.  
303 Ibid.  
304 Ibid. 
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provides only the legally related documents to the CFC lawyer and not the full Ministry 
file, which may include information about programs the child has attended in the past.  
CFC lawyers feel they cannot meet the requirements of the amicus role or instructional 
advocate role without this information.306  
 The best Interest model (frequently referred to guardian ad litem model in the 
Canadian context) requires that the lawyer introduce not just the relevant evidence and 
the child’s views but “advocates for a position based on the lawyer’s assessment of the 
interests of the child.”307 Confidentiality is not central to the best interest model. The best 
interest advocate is not bound to advocate based on the child’s instructions. As such, the 
outcome advanced by the child may align with the lawyer’s perception or may 
substantially differ.  The evidence that the lawyer presents is arguably heavily influenced 
by what that lawyer perceives to be in the child’s best interest. The lawyer may argue 
against the outcome the child has expressed.308 Australia, the United States, Great Britain, 
and parts of Canada all have adopted the best interest model in the lawyer-child-client 
relationship. Although frequently adopted in many jurisdictions, the best interest model 
poses significant risk with respect to whether counsel appointed for the child has the 
training to identify what is truly in the child’s best interest.309 Significant risk exists that 
the lawyer is advancing personal bias as to what that lawyer believes to be in the child’s 
best interest. Despite these concerns, the role has been adopted and promoted as 
providing a full picture to courts whose must determine the best outcome for the child. 																																																								
306 Supra note 8. Wanuskewin CFC Training, October 14 2016 
307 Supra note 49 at 683.  
308 SEE Boukema v. Boukema (1997), 31 R.F.L. (4th) 329 (Ont.Sup. Ct.). Child’s counsel 
advocated a different position from the child’s expressed wishes based on two mental health 
professionals’ evidence that the mother was manipulating the child.  However, the court held that 
the lawyer was still required to advance the child-client’s views despite any manipulation.   
309 Supra note 49 at 683. 
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Models of advocacy within countries can vary considerably. For example, Saskatchewan 
and Ontario both have law society protocols in relation to the lawyer’s role in advocating 
for children, which differ drastically. Saskatchewan has explicitly adopted an 
instructional advocate approach while Ontario remains under the best interest framework.  
Appell questions whether the approach of appointing a best interest counsel has enhanced 
attention to the child’s ‘voice’ in cases involving state intervention.310  The best interest 
model has the potential to seriously undermine the meaning of giving children ‘voice’ as 
articulated in the CRC: “[g]iven the silence of children in these processes, the 
contingency of childhood and the cultural diversity of norms, the person that represents a 
child's interests can make a great deal of difference regarding whether advocacy reflects 
the child's own values and experiences or those of his or her representatives”311.  
Complicating matters, the child’s lawyer is unlikely to be from the same socio-economic, 
cultural and racial background, which could result in the homogenization of minorities.312 
Part of the function of a democratic liberal society is that “freedoms arguably mandate 
decisional privacy within the parent-child relationship (albeit with some limits) as 
expressions of adult moral autonomy and as the primary method for shaping future 
democratic citizens who are separate enough from the state to govern in a democracy.”313 
The separation of children in the lawyer-child-client relationship results in isolating 
children from their immediate family, community, and lawyer (representative). This 
disconnect raises the risk that the lawyer will not be aware of the specific social and 
cultural norms of the child, permitting the lawyer to impose personal paternalistic ideas 																																																								
310 Annette R. Appell, “Representing children representing what? Critical reflections on 
lawyering for children” (2008) 39:3 Colum HRL Rev 573 at 575.  
311 Ibid at 586. 
312 Annette R. Appell, “"Bad" Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers” (2007) 7 Nev. L.J. 759.  
313 Supra note 310 at 603. 
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onto the child, supporting the chronic concern that the right to participation and the right 
to protection are mutually incompatible.314  
 The concerns raised by Appell are eerily familiar to the current issues faced by 
children subject to child welfare system in Saskatchewan. This concern was explicitly 
expressed by one Director of a Saskatchewan FNCFSA: 
They are basically going to be doing what they think they should do, or what they 
would want in the case.  You look specifically at children, this goes down to 
children that can’t speak for themselves…you are going to have a lawyer who is 
going to argue on behalf of a baby on what should happen to that baby. It is a 
weird thing. 
you will have someone from down south who will have no connection to them 
even remotely, that is going to work on this file for a child that they really don’t 
know anything about 
 you [lawyer] are going to be operating from a different value position, it does not 
seem like that would be the most appropriate way to deal with if you have 
concerns regarding the voice of a child.  There could be other ways to come up 
with something other than this [counsel for children and youth program].315 
 
Children have at least two competing sets of rights: participatory and dependency 
rights.316 In the child welfare context, lawyers advocating for children can easily promote 
dependency/protective rights as a means of promoting state interests and fail to take into 
consideration the child’s participatory rights.317 Thus, lawyers may implant their 
perception of childhood norms onto the child in ignorance of cultural, social, racial, and 
ethnic diversity, which contributes to the legitimization of systemic problems.318 Glenda 
Cooney, past Deputy Saskatchewan Children’s Advocate identified this issue:  
It is a very difficult role to advocate, because you want to fix things and you 
predetermine. A legal test for best interest is very difficult, because there are so 
																																																								
314 Supra note 49. 
315 Supra note 54. 
316 Supra note 310 at 614-616. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Supra note 310 at 619. 
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many variables, ages, background, mental capacity…what is problematic is that 
the judge knows nothing about child welfare or the family.319 Glenda Cooney 
 
Viewing children in isolation and separating their interests from those of their families 
and communities, although sometimes necessary, can discount the fullness of their 
lives.320 Dale Hensley notes that the best interest model in the Canadian context has the 
potential to allow lawyers, rather than the courts, to decide the outcome: “[a]nyone who 
represents children knows the incredible power and influence of counsel for the child. 
Professor Bala invites counsel to have even more power and influence but with no 
predictability or fairness. If counsel is ‘guided by his or her own assessment of the best 
interests of the child,’ counsel usurps the role of the decision-maker without the existing 
procedural safeguards.”321 Most lawyers acting for children do not intentionally usurp the 
role of the decision maker by advancing a best interest approach, nor do they 
intentionally wish to negatively influence the child’s future. The reality is that the 
approach easily falls victim to stigma, bias, and arguably does not fully meet the 
requirements as articulated in Article 12 of the CRC.  
 The Instructional Advocate (traditional advocate) requires that “[l]awyers who 
adopt an ‘instructional advocate’ role have a relationship with a child that is based on the 
same ethical and professional responsibilities that apply to adult clients.”322 Despite 
several jurisdictions adopting the tradition lawyer-client model in relation to children, 
including the CFC, the model risks the infiltration of the lawyer’s perceived best interest 
																																																								
319 Supra note 163. 
320 Guggenheim, supra note 87. 
321 Dale Hensley, “Role and responsibilities of counsel for the child in Alberta: A practitioner’s 
perspective and a response to Professor Bala.” (2006) 43 Alb L Rev 871 at 902. 
322 Supra note 49 at 684. 
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for the child. With reference to the F. (M.) v. L. (J.)323 decision, Bala noted that   
In a growing number of jurisdictions there are professional standards or court 
decisions that oblige lawyers who represent children to adopt an advocate role. For 
example, in the Canadian province of Quebec, Article 34 of the Civil Code  
requires that the child is to be heard by the court in any case where their interests 
are affected, if they have the ability to express themselves. There is a fairly 
extensive legal aid program in that province to provide representation for children 
who are the subject of family proceedings. In 2002, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
ruled that lawyers who represent children should adopt an advocate role 
whenever a child gives clear instructions.324 [Emphasis added]. 
 
What remains debatable is whether lawyers actually feel comfortable in engaging in a 
clear instructional advocacy role with child clients in jurisdictions where there is 
direction from law societies, legislation and governing bodies to adopt an instructional 
advocacy model.325  
This uncertainty is reflected in Bala’s study involving interviews of lawyers in 
both Alberta and Ontario. In Alberta, “[a]lthough the vast majority of Alberta children’s 
lawyers support in principle the Law Society’s presumption of instructional advocacy, 
over half indicated that they would not adopt an instructional advocacy role if doing so 
would place the child at a ‘serious risk of harm,’….[o]ther lawyers, however, feel 
ethically obliged to advocate based on the views of their child clients, regardless of the 
risk that this may pose.”326 Conversely, in Ontario, over half of the participants indicated 
that they adopt a best interest model which is legislatively mandated.  Over 60 percent of 
those Ontario lawyers interviewed in the study stated that, even if the child expressed a 
																																																								
323 F. (M.) v. L. (J.) 2002 CarswellQue 337, [2002] J.Q. No.480 (Que. C.A.) 
324 Supra note 49 at 684. 
325 In the United States ,the American Bar has recently become supportive of lawyers representing 
children adopting an instructional advocacy role.(see American Bar Association, Model Act 
Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings 
(August 2011, adopted February 2012), section 7(c). online: 
<http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/docs/aba_model_act_2011.pdf> 
326 Supra note 49 at 691. 
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wish, they would not provide that information to the court if they believed the child to be 
too young to have capacity to understand their request.327 Bala identifies that “[w]hile 
there is a need for flexibility and discretion in applying any ethical standards, one has to 
wonder how much the nature of representation that a child actually receives is affected by 
the individual lawyer who happens to be assigned to a case.”328 Australian studies have 
indicated a similar lack of consistency in models adopted by lawyers. A New South 
Wales study indicated that, despite the statutory framework that articulates a best interest 
model for children under the age of 12 and an instructional model for those children over 
12, often the advocate’s personal views of the best interest for the child influence what 
information to provide to the court.329   
It is problematic when a lawyer imposes their personal views regarding what is in 
the best interest as it undermines the intentions of the CRC to promote children’s voice in 
the context of the best interest of the individual child. The lawyer’s failure to act as an 
instructional advocate undermines the court’s role, which is ultimately there to assess all 
the relevant information, including the child’s views. The risk of the best interest 
approach, which is the standard most heavily relied upon by lawyers practicing in this 
area of law, is that there is confusion about what “best interest” means.  Best interest 
becomes confused when the lawyer attempts to understand it from their personal social 
and cultural background.  
Saskatchewan has largely adopted an advocacy model from Alberta that mandates 
instructional advocacy.  However, lawyers are typically not trained in understanding the 																																																								
327 Ibid at 690. 
328 Ibid at 693. 
329 Nicola M. Ross, “Different Views? Children’s Lawyers and Children’s Participation in 
Protective Proceedings in New South Wales” (2013) 27:3 Int’s JL, Pol’y & Fam 332. 
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intricacies of child development nor is it their role to do so. Whether a lawyer can 
adequately advocate for a child does require that they are aware of the cultural difference 
that may result in the child’s expression of their interests that could clash with what the 
lawyer perceives to be in the child’s interest.  
Child participation enhances children’s social and economic status as well as 
fulfilling the child’s participatory rights as the child procedural rights ensure access to 
substantively just outcomes.330 While child participation helps fulfill international 
obligations to enhance children’s rights under the CRC, participation needs to be 
meaningful and needs to reflect the social, cultural and spiritual needs of the child. 
Similar to the way environmental consultation with Indigenous groups requires that the 
consultation process be “meaningful,” child participation also needs to be meaningful. 
The CCRC found that 
Young people in care indicated that often they are not informed about their rights, 
the options available to them for support or protection of their rights, and ways 
they can have a voice in decisions that affect them. Youth reported that decisions 
are generally made for them and not with them, sometimes with no explanation. 
Young people want their caregivers and social workers to ask for their views on 
options for their care, to be transparent with them about why decisions are made, 
and to facilitate access to appeal processes of decisions made for them. This 
includes participation in plans of care, placement options, family reunification, or 
continued contact with biological or adoptive family members when possible. To 
implement the Convention, these rights should be legislated as a mandatory 
standard for all child welfare agencies and services intended for young people in 
care.331 
 
Current models available in Saskatchewan partially fulfill the child’s right to be heard but 
no model currently utilized fully satisfies Article 12 of the CRC nor appropriately 
addresses issues specific to Indigenous children and their communities. Partial fulfillment 
results from discretionary appointments and lack of availability of representation in 																																																								
330 Supra note 321. 
331 Supra note 56 at 67. 
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remote communities and FNCFSA.  Presently a lawyer, judge or MSS worker has to 
identify a perceived need for counsel, contact the CFC program and hope a lawyer is 
available for appointment.  
6.3 CHALLENGING PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION 
Saskatchewan Advocate for Children and Youth (Saskatchewan Advocate) is an 
independent office of the Legislature with a goal of creating “systemic change for the 
benefit of the young people in Saskatchewan.”332 While an independent office, the 
Saskatchewan Advocate does make recommendations through public reports that are 
intended for government to adopt. These reports frequently address systemic issues in 
relation to child welfare; however, only approximately one quarter of their 
recommendations are actually implemented.333 With respect to access to advocacy 
services, the Saskatchewan Advocate program was a stakeholder in the development of 
the CFC program. Although the Saskatchewan Advocate office has an explicit mandate 
to uphold the provisions of the CRC, the lack of legislative action at the provincial and 
federal level creates a patchwork framework for the implementation of Article 12.  
To attempt to make CRC implementation more consistent, the CCRC raised the issue of 
establishing a National Children’s Advocate.334 They argue that absence of a National 
Children’s Advocate or Commission results in gaps in the services available to children 
who fall under federal jurisdiction. Additionally, jurisdictional issues exist with respect to 
whether the provincial children’s advocate properly has jurisdiction over FNCFSA:  																																																								
332 Saskatchewan Advocate: a voice for children and youth, online: Advocate for Children and 
Youth <http://www.saskadvocate.ca/about-us >.  
333 Trevor Bothorel, “Bob Pringle’s term as Saskatchewan’s children’s Advocate won’t be 
renewed” (December 2 2015) online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/bob-pringle-s-term-as-saskatchewan-s-children-s-
advocate-won-t-be-renewed-1.3348141>.  
334 Supra note 56 at 11. 
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Provincial children’s advocate was rejected right from the beginning by the First 
Nations Agencies, and the problem was not advocacy, the problem was 
jurisdiction. And the provincial government said this is the advocate and you have 
jurisdiction on reserve. 
From the First nations perspective it has always been a rejection against the way 
it was done and then the way it rolled out. I have had advocates say ‘ I don’t need 
your approval I have authority over every child and everything and have 
threatened to go to court.  
…we consider ourselves a federal entity and undertaking and we have always 
maintained that.  Our funding comes from the federal government. Should there 
be a First Nations children’s advocate? I believe absolutely there should, but I 
also believe that it should be a federal children’s advocate of some sort, because 
this is on reserve, we are on reserve. The province is saying, well you only have 
child welfare because we delegated it to you, so therefore we retain exclusive 
jurisdiction. What happens then if there is self-government?335Confidential  
 
A National Advocate would “resolve gaps for children that occur as a result of 
federalism”336. Pringle notes that he is “a strong proponent for transferring all aboriginal 
child welfare to First Nations and Métis”337 and believes that this should include children 
residing both on and off reserve.338 The jurisdictional conflict was highlighted by de 
Whytell: 
The Child's Advocate office is not independent because they are operating from 
the same colonial view point of superiority of the First Nations….When the Childs 
Advocate reaches out, it reaches out as a representative of the government, “oh I 
deserve all this information, so give it to me””. Well actually, you are not the 
Child Advocate for the First Nation, you are the Advocate for the province, and 
therefore monitoring things for the province.339 Josephine de Whytell. 
 
Woods also notes that the Children’s Advocate does not properly have jurisdiction over 
FNCFSA because “there is no unified voice for the agencies in Saskatchewan.”340 Woods 
believes that, technically, the Children’s Advocate does not have jurisdiction on reserve 
and that an independent Indigenous children’s advocate with federal legislation that staffs 																																																								
335 Supra note 54. 
336 Supra note 56 at 15. 
337 Supra note 145. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Supra note 29. 
340 Supra note 79. 
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Indigenous peoples should have jurisdiction on reserve.  Woods suggests that, if that 
were to occur, many of the issues that FNCFSA face could be unified: issues with respect 
to quality of services could be addressed and jurisdictional issues would no longer 
sidetrack the larger issues that FNCFSA face. A federal children’s advocate with 
legislative oversight of FNCFSA would support Indigenous governance over child 
welfare and would be accepted by the FNCFSA as appropriate oversight.  
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CHAPTER 7: LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Before providing a conclusion, it is notable that there are several limitations to this 
research and areas that are identified as needing further research. First, , more research is 
needed with respect to individual nations and what “advocacy” means for a particular 
nation.  As such, it would be beneficial for research to be conducted with First Nations at 
a more community based level rather than review advocacy on the provincial scale.  This 
is particularly relevant in Canada as cultural practices vary significantly between nations 
and even neighboring nations and within FNCFSA. Additionally, research is needed with 
respect to how culturally appropriate child welfare practices could be codified into 
provincial and federal legislation. Finally, it is noted that limited discussion in this thesis 
focused on Métis communities and what those communities need with respect to 
improving child welfare for their children. 
 This thesis identifies several issues contributing to the child welfare crisis that 
currently exists in Saskatchewan, namely the vast overrepresentation of Indigenous 
children in care. Canada’s colonial history and Euro-Canadian understanding of childcare 
housed in an individual rights framework has resulted in misunderstandings of communal 
rights. Further, this has resulted in Canada’s failure to meet CRC standards of meaningful 
voice for Indigenous children. Failing to implement the CRC in legislative frameworks 
not only disadvantages all children subject to the child welfare system, but also has 
disproportionate negative impacts on the Indigenous child’s voice.  
 To properly implement CRC, as it relates to Indigenous children, at a minimum 
consultation between affected First Nations groups must take place prior to the 
implementation of provincial and federal programs affecting Indigenous children.  
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Provincial failure to meet consultation requirements is well documented in both the CFC 
office and the Children’s Advocate office. Without consultation, CRC standards will not 
be met for Indigenous children. As many of the provincial agreements between the MSS 
and FNCFSA come to an end, rather than renegotiate s.61 CFSA agreements, a deliberate 
shift of governance over child welfare services to FNCFSA may be possible. Analysis of 
the current case law and informant interviews suggests that the current structure of 
contracting with the province to deliver provincial frameworks of child welfare does not 
work for First Nations and Métis peoples. Delegated FNCFSA continue to receive 
reduced program funding as compared to the MSS. This multi-agency structure results in 
fragmentation and miscommunication all at the cost of the Indigenous child’s voice and 
access to justice. Uneven funding arrangements between First FNCFSA and the MSS 
raises serious questions around fairness, justice and equity.  In order to maximize 
FNCFSA’s ability to find culturally appropriate care for their children, funding must be 
provided equally to that provided by the provincial government.  
 In consideration of s.25 of the Charter, the Indigenous child’s individual rights are 
potentially derogating from Indigenous self-governance, including the ability to raise 
children and protect children’s culture. Balancing the communal right of cultural integrity 
is difficult when faced with a child’s individual right to stability and security.  Both the 
provincial child welfare system and FNCFSA operate on a threshold system.  This system 
has inadequacies in both provincial and FNCFSA frameworks but its impacts are 
resulting in a disproportionate number of Indigenous children in care.  
 Legitimizing communal rights would enhance the child’s individual rights and 
ultimately contribute to the child’s best interest. Loss of culture and individual identity 
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does not contribute to the best interest of the child as set out in the CFSA, and Canada’s 
commitment to the implementation of the CRC and Canada’s commitment to the TRC 
Calls to Action.  Balancing individual and communal rights would more accurately 
satisfy the best interest of the child test, which should be enhanced by the inclusion of 
counsel, a guardian ad litem or a band member(s) acting for the child. Suggested here is a 
role for culturally appropriate child advocacy nested in traditional values that is 
controlled by First Nations and Métis people and not by the MSS.  Resources to meet 
these needs is the responsibility of the federal government.  
 Culturally appropriate advocacy for children is essential for a decision maker to 
ultimately find in the best interest of the child rather than finding in a perceived best 
interest, which is a risk with the current system of advocacy for children. In order for 
Saskatchewan to meet the criteria outlined in Article 12 of the CRC it is essential that 
child welfare be placed back in the hands of Indigenous communities to decide how 
children’s voice will be implemented. Placing child welfare in the Indigenous community 
will promote the Indigenous child’s voice in a meaningful and culturally appropriate way 
without westernized constraints and ideologies that have contributed to the genocidal 
effect of what is child welfare in Saskatchewan today. As a result of the research 
conducted, including discussions with Interviewees, reflection of the TRC’s principles 
and recommendations, and issues identified by the Family Caring Societies Human 
Rights decision it is recommended THAT: 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. The federal government immediately provide funding that is equal to 
Ministry of Social Services funding provided to the provinces for First 
Nations Child and Family Service Agencies (FNCFSA) and Métis services. 
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2. The federal government works with and supports FNCFSA in the 
development of federal legislation that enables FNCFSA and Métis people to 
govern their own process. 
 
3. A deliberate transfer of child welfare to First Nations and Métis control. In 
the interim, until control is placed back in the hand of Indigenous 
communities, that the MSS notify any Indigenous child’s community 
immediately upon apprehension of any Indigenous child who is a member of 
the First Nation or Métis community, or who is eligible for membership.  
 
4. The creation of an Indigenous National Children’s Advocate which has 
jurisdictional oversight of First Nations and Métis child welfare agencies 
which can ensure that FNCFSA mandates, policies and legislation are being 
conformed with. 
 
5. A commitment from the federal government and provinces that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child be explicitly legislated for under both 
provincial and federal legislation involving children. 
 
6.  “Meaningful voice” for First Nations children not be limited to the use of a 
lawyer in child welfare matters, but rather be implemented by the child’s 
community. 
 
7. Lawyer representation for children be available in all court processes 
involving children and not be limited to child welfare matters.  
 
8. Culturally appropriate representation for children not be discretionarily 
applied but mandated for in all child welfare matters. 
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Future research in the area of child welfare is needed.  Specifically, it would be useful 
to have recommendations from Saskatchewan First Nation communities that could 
provide direction as to how to implement ‘voice’ for Indigenous children in child welfare 
matters. It may be the case that Indigenous communities have very different concepts of 
how to provide their children with voice in matters affecting them.  As such, it is essential 
that more research be conducted with respect to individual communities.   
Finally, it is my hope that this research can be used to help policy makers and lawyers 
acting in child welfare cases identify the deeply rooted cultural biases that exist in the 
justice system.  It is the obligation of people practicing in this area of the law to ensure 
the child’s well being and voice is heard.  This research is for Indigenous children in 
Saskatchewan.  						
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH INTERVIEW FRAMEWORK 
 
Introductory questions:  
• What is your role/employment currently? 
• How/why did you become interested in this area of work?  
• Personal history 
• Employment history 
• What organizations have you worked with: Reasons for becoming 
interested in child advocacy/child welfare (and specific organization if 
applicable)? 
 
Counsel for children in MSS Cases: (Questions for Counsel) 
 
• How many files have you been involved in that have required a 
independent child advocate to act on behalf of the child?  
• Have you been involved with a child who has been court appointed 
independent counsel? 
• When considering child advocacy are you more concerned with the “best 
interest principle” of the child or advocating on behalf of the “child’s 
wishes and opinions”.  What are the pros and cons of each model? 
• What barriers exist for children having to access of counsel? 
 
Funding issues: 
 
• What funding is available in your organization/practice to advocate on 
behalf of children. Who provides this funding?  
• What resources are needed (federal/provincial/Indigenous Child welfare 
Agencies and MSS Agencies) 
• Recent Human Rights Decision (FNCFCS) -  
 
Reasons for Child Apprehensions: 
 
• In the child welfare context, what are the primary reasons you see children 
being apprehended from their families? 
• What preventative programs could be introduced to support families and 
reduce child apprehensions? 
• How has our colonial history shaped the current child welfare crisis for 
Indigenous children and communities in Saskatchewan? 
o Is the current system as form of cultural genocide? 
o How are systemic issues impacting current statistics in the 
province? 
 
 
 
 
Indigenous Children in SK and TRC Calls to Action: 
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• What issues can you identify as being specific to Indigenous children 
(concerning both residing on reserve/off reserve)?  
• What training do child advocates receive in relation to cultural sensitivities 
and awareness in relation to Indigenous children? 
• What policy/legal/legislation could improve child welfare in SK 
• What are issues specifically faced by First Nations Operated Agencies? 
• Do you see a need for a national children’s advocate/ombudsman? 
• Do you feel that children of all ages should have legal counsel or an 
individual advocate, or should advocacy be specific to a particular age or 
at all? 
• How can the TRC’s Calls to Action be implemented in SK child welfare 
cases and services?  
 
International obligations: 
 
• Familiarity with Canada’s international obligations under the CRC and UNDRIP 
• CRC (for example) mandates that children have a “voice” in matters concerning 
them.  What would meaningful voice for Indigenous children in Canada 
(specifically SK) require? 
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APPENDIX B: ETHICS APPROVAL 
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